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Formation and C~nsequences of Going Concern 
Opinions: A Revie'v of the Literature 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Jodi Gissel 
Marquette University 
Jesse C. Robertson 
Univcrsity of Nortb Texas 
Chad M. Stefaniak 
Oklahoma State University 
Shortly after the passage of SAS No. 59 [AICPA, 1988bJ, Asare [1990] 
(hereafter, Asare) swnmarized the evolution of research on the going concem 
opinion (GCO) in order to evaluate the Auditing Standards Board 's (ASB} as,.. 
sumptions regarding the signals sent to the market via the GCO. Whlle Asare 
provided a thorough review of research on the importance of GCOs and audi-
tors' judgment processes in fonning GCOs, he also suggested that the existi.ng 
.¡·esearch findings were not always consistent and suggested several opportuni-
ties for future resea.rch that would enhance o~ understanding and unravel sorne 
of the conflicting findings. Over the past twenty years, researchers have con-
tinued to investígate the importance of GCOs. Our objectives are to bring cur-
rent the evolution of standards, regulations, and literature concerníng GCOs, to 
synthesize a body of research that stil.I presents inconsistent findings, and to 
suggest future research that could further our understanding of GCO fonnation 
and consequences. 
An updated review of the literature investigating GCO forrnation and con-
sequences is ímportant to future research because these opinions can have far-
reaching and direct consequences for auditors, their'clients, client shareholders, 
and other client stakeholders (e.g., creditors; future imr~stors). Further, many 
studies have continued to investigate issues pertainingto GCOs. While Asare's 
review incorporated the results of approximately 5Q research papers spanning 
about 20 years, we identified over 125 papers conceming GCOs in the 20 years 
since Asare's review. Given the large volume of research on GCOs, our review 
wiU be especially helpful to researchers interested in examining new (or unre-
sol ved) issues within this field of accountingresearch 
The autbors would like lo thank Stephen Asare (editor) and tWo anonymou's reviewers for 
thcir comments. 
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We initially identified published academic papers for inclusion in our re-
view of the GCO literatme by searching the ABI Infonn and Business Source 
Complete databases using the follo~ing k~ywprds: audit opi!llon, audit r~po1t, 
ooinc:> concern, and opinion shop. To inc]ude a more complete body of btera-
ftue,0 we augmented the papers identified frorn the databases with additional 
relevant papers ídentifíed via citatíon analysis. Asare reviewed the literatttre 
through 1 990, so we restricted discussions of specifi.c papers to those published 
after 1990. Asare divided his review into the following general sections: (1) the 
evolution of auditing standards regarding the GCO; (2) the ability of an auditor 
to identify companies experiencing going coocern problems; and (3) the conse-
quences of the GCO. We str ucture our literature review along the same three 
broad parameters, and compare the summary results of studies conducted since 
1990 to the conclusions reached by Asare wíthin each section. 
In lhe second section, we address research relatt::d to changes in regulations 
or requirements related to auditors' responsibilities to report going concem 
uncertaínties. In the third section, we sunm1arize research rélated to auditors' 
identification and forma:tion of GCOs. In the fourth section we discuss the in-
formational value of the GCO, specifícally consequences to client stakeholders 
and audit firrns. We ínclude Tables in each section that provide a brief sum-
mary of the reviewed studies.1 We close with conclusions and a summary of 
suggestions for future research. 
2.0 THE RESPONSIDILITY FOR REPORTING GOlNG CONCERN 
UNCERTAINTIES 
2.1 Background and Update on GCO Standar·ds and Regulations 
Standards and regulations govem auditors' responsibilities for and report-
ing of GCOs. While auditors' responsibilities concerning·GCO reporting have 
remained relatively stable, standards have evolved ovel' time to update the re-
porting language and to clarify auditors' obligations. Under currenc guidance, 
auditors express a GCO when there is "substantial doubt'~ about the client's 
ability to remain in business by either modifying the unqualified opinion or 
issuing a disclaimer of opinion (AICPA, 1988a; AICPA, 1988b]. A swvey 
conducted by Ponemon and Raghunandan [ 1994], found that analysts and 
bankers associate "substantial doubt" with the highest probability of failure, 
judges and legislativ.e aides assigned the lowest probability: and auditors fell 
belween .the t:-vo groups. The authors conclude that users assign greater weight 
than aucbtors mtend. Regardless of which form of opinion auditors select, stan-
daro~ require a :eference to tbe uncertainty surrounding the c!ient 's abi1ity to 
contmue as a gomg concem in the event of a GCO [AICPA, 1988b]. 
The AICPA has issued several statements since SAS No. 59 that iníluence 
GCOs, most of which clarify or provide additional guidance beyond SAS No. 
59. For exampJe, SAS No. 64 clarifi~.d. that the auditor should include the terms 
"substantial doubt" and "going concem" when issuing a GCO [AICPA, 1990, 
• 
1 
'When !he resulls of a paper concem more than one scction, we inc!ude the paper in al] relcvaJlt 
secuons of thc ICXI and tables. 
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paragraph 1]. The AICPA [1995a] amended SAS No. 59 with SAS No. 77, to 
preclude the use of conditional language in expressing the GCO. Additionally, 
the AICPA [ 1995b] issued AU 9341 to chu·ify that the auditor is under no obli-
gation to reissue an opinion \.vithout the GCO explanatory paragraph if the cli-
ent later resolves the uncertainties, but if a GCO is reissued as a standard, un-
rnodified opinion the auditor should perform certain procedures. Fmther, the 
ASB is cunently considering revising SAS No. 59 to make the U.S. standard 
more consistent with international standards [AICPA, 2010]_2 
The passage of several federal laws in the United States, subsequent to 
SAS Nos. 58 and 59, also have influenced the regulatory environment sur-
rounding GCOs. In response to the AICPA's and public accounting firms' con-
cems about the profession's "litigation crisis," the U.S. Congress passed the 
· , Private Securities Litigation Refonn Act (PSLRA) of 1995 ]U.S.H.R., 1995], 
,~hich had a marked impact on public accountíng firms by reducing individual 
=áuctitors' liability exposure with respect to litigation involving publicly-traded 
Clients to theír specífic responsibílity for the audit [Messier et al., 2010; Geiger 
et al., 2006; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2001]. However, the PSLRA covered 
oniy suits filed in federal courts, which led plaintiffs to shift venucs from fed~ 
eral to statc courts [Mcssier et al., 2010]. Subsequent efforts by the AICPA and 
the public accounting profession led to passage of the Securities Litigation Uni-
form Standards Act of 1998 [U.S. H.R., 1998], which essentially closed this 
·potential venue loophole [Messíer et al., 201 O Geiger and Raghunandan, 
:i002a]. 
-- In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 
[U.S.H.R., 2002], which led auditors lo believe that the risks associated with 
~auditíng public clients increased [Ryu et al., 2009}. In addition to changing the 
legal environment of auditing, SOX created the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) and empowered it to promulgate new auditing stan-
. -dards for public company audits, ending the era of prívate standard setting for 
the audit of public cornpanies [U.S.H.R., 2002]. 
One change the PCAOB has made concerning GCOs is a modlfication to 
the second paragraph of SAS No. 59. This change directs auditors to use their 
knowledge of subsequent events followíng the financia! statement date but be-
fare the audit opinion date when considering whether to issue a GCO [PCAOB, 
2 010, p. 538}. Before this change, SAS No. 59 instructed audítors to consider 
subsequent events at the completion of fieldwork [AICPA, 1988b]. Addition-
ally, at the onset of the most recent recession, the PCAOB issued Staff Audit 
Practice Alert No. 3 to outline GCO considerations in the economic downturn 
[PCAOB, 2008]. In this alert, the PCAOB note d the possibility that the reces-
sien could lead to increased risk of going concern uncertainties, and suggested 
auditors consider obtaining additionai information concerning loan defaults, 
debt restructuring, denial of credit, and negative trends in operating income, 
' Specifically, Lhe AICPA is concentrating their efforts on converging SAS No. 59 wit11 ISA 570 in 
terms of (l ) the time period that the auditor muse cover when assessing an cntity's golng conccrn, (2) lcngth 
of time beyond the tlnancíal statemenl dlJte that Lhe auditor is re.,p<msible lo assess, and (3) requiring thc 
auditor to inquire of management as lo ils knowlcdge of e vents or conditions beyond the period of man agc-
ment's assessment tilat indicate thcrc could be substantial doubt ab<Jut the cntily's abílity lo continue as a 
going conccm. 
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cash flows, and financia] ratios. This alert implies that the PCAOB recom-
mends auditors consider going above and beyond the requirements of SAS No. 
59 in a recess ion because of increased risk of client failures. 
The remainder of this section reviews the researcb that has investigated the 
impact of the aforemeotioned standards and regulations. Asare's review did not 
identify published papers that investigated the effects of regulatory changes on 
auditors' propensity to issue GCOs. However, several studies subsequent to 
1990 have examined tbe effects of both standards and regulations on auditors' 
propensity to issue GCOs. The key issue in Section 2.2 is whether changes in 
standards (SAS Nos. 58 and 59) and regulations (e.g., SOX) influenced auditor 
judgments and decisions conceming GCOs. For example, we review papers 
that shed 1ight on whether SOX changed auditors' propensity to issue GCOs, 
and whether any such change was temporary or represents a more pennanent 
change in behavior. Table 1 summarizes these studies. 
TABLE 1: The Responsibility for Reporting Going Concern Uncertainties 
(Sections 2.1 and 2.2) 
Study Sample Dependent lndependent Key (Method) Variable[s] Variable[s] Findinds] 
Ponemon and 95 bankers, Perceived Participant Analysts and 
Raghunandan 88 analysts, mean.ing of group ban.kers 
[1994] 32judges, the terru (bankers, associate 
(Survey) 45 auditors, "substantial analysts, etc.) "substanlial 
and doubt" in a doubt" with the 
2 legislative GCO highest 
aides probability, 
' 
while judges 
and legislative 
aides assigned 
the lowest 
probabilíty, with 
auditors 
between the two 
groups. The 
- authors 
conclude that 
users assign 
greater weight 
tban auditors 
Griner and 
intend. 
3,765 Whether the WhetherSAS Non Big N auclit 
Dugan [1994] observations auditor issues No. 59 is in ftrms were more (Archiva!) from U.S. aGCO effect likely to issue 
public GCOs after SAS 
companies 58 than befare 
from July 1, the standard 
J 987 through 
June 30, 1989 
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Carcello et al. 446 U .S. public Whether the Regime (SAS Auditors were 
[ 1995] compantes with auditor issues No. 59, SAS more likely to 
(Archiva!) bankruptcy- aOCO No. 34, Pre- issue GCOs 
rehtted SAS No. 34) following SAS 
opinions from No. 34 only 
1972- 1992 
Raghunandan 362 non- Whether the Whether SAS After SAS No. 
and Rama bankrupt auditor issues No. 59 is in 59, auditors 
[ 1995] companies are aOCO effect were more 
(Archival) compared with Iikely to issue 
175 bankrupt GCOs for 
companies. fin;mcia lly 
stressed non-
bankrupt 
companies and 
for bankrupt 
companics prior 
lo failurc 
Carcello et aL 248 (440) u.s. Whether the Whether SAS Difference in 
[1997] public bankrupt auditor issues No. 59 ís in results between 
(Arcllival) (distressd, non- aOCO effect Carcello ct al. 
. .. bankrupt) [1995] and 
companies Raghum.1.ndan et 
-
from J 987- al. [1995] was 
1988 and 1990- an artHact of 
1991 how each swdy 
managed the 
transition period 
from the time 
the SAS No. 59 
was released 
and the time at 
which the new 
standard 
became 
effective 
Geiger and 383 bankrupt Whether the Whether the Audi tors were 
Raghunandan companies auditor issues PSLRA is in less likely to 
[200 1 J frorn 1991 to aOCO effect issue prior 
(Archiva!) 1998 GCOs for 
bankrupr 
companies after 
the passage of 
the PSLRA Acl 
of1995 
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Geiger and 1,871 u.s. Whetherthe Whether the GCOs were less 
Raghunandan pub líe auditor issues PSLRA and likely after each 
[2002a) companies aGCO Securities successive 
(Archiva!) under financia! Litigation regulatory 
stress during Uniform change 
1992-1993, Standards Acl 
1996-97,and are in effect 
!999-2000 
Carcello et al. Al\ (82) GCOs Whether a Audit Non-standard 
[2003] issued to public client committee going concern 
(Archival) manufacturing dismissed its characteristics reports were 
companies auditor associated with 
between 1989- befare the longer auditor 
1995 anda client's next tenure, less 
matched annual report client di stress, 
sample of non- companies with 
going concern lower 
companies probabilities of 
filing for 
bankruptcy 
Schaub and 43 firms Average Whether SAS The changes 
Highfield issuing 'subject standardized No. 59 is in required by SAS 
[2003J to' modified abnormal effect No. 58 and SAS 
(Archival) opinions from returns No. 59 were 
l984- L988 and cosmetic, and 
36 firms did not affect 
announcing the information 
GCOs from content of those 
1989-1996 opinions 
Citron and 213 going Whether the U.K. standru·ds The increase in 
Taftler concern, and auditor issues changes GCOs in the 
[20041 1,456 non a OCO similar toSAS U.K. in the 
(Archival) going concern, Nos. 58 and 59 1990s was 
U.K public attributable to a 
companies changein 
from 1991- auditing 
1996 standards that 
allowed auditors 
to reporl going 
concerns as a 
modified 
unqualified 
opinion 
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Chen et al. 4,493 Whether the N/A Chinese 
[20051 observations audi!or issues government 
(Archival) from Chinese aOCO regulations 
public concerning 
companies state-owned 
from 1995- enterpriscs, 
2000 corporate 
disclosures, and 
pub he 
accounting 
practices appear 
to have 
l. 
stimulated an 
. . 
mercase m 
~~\ OC Os 
Farrugia and 419 
1 
Whether the NIA The majority of 
Baldacchino observations i auditor issues GCOs in Malla 
[2005] from Maltese aGCO typically use 
(Archiva!) companies ambiguous 
from 1997- wordíng that is 
2000 insufficient 
.. based on 
international 
;: : 
auditing 
standm·ds 
Geiger et al. 226 companies Whether the Whether SOX Auditors were ¡ [2005] that entered auditor íssues is in effect more likely to 
•. (Archiva!) iuto bankruptcy aGCO issue GCOs 
Jrom 2000- ~· . after December 
2003. 31, 200 1 (SOX) 
Geiger et aL 694 U.S. publ ic Whelher the Whether Lhe Auditors' 
[2006] companies that auditor íssues PSLRA is in propensity to 
(Archiva!) entered aOCO effect issue GCOs 
bankruptcy decreased 
from 199 i- following the 
2001 PSLRA, 
espécially 
among Big'N 
auditors 
Fargher'and 1,769 (pre~ Whether the Whethcr SOX Auditors are 
Jiang [2008] SOX) and auditor issues is ineffect more !ikely to 
(Archiva!) 3,344 (post- aGCO issue GCOs in 
SOX)' · 2003 (than pre-
Ausiiálian sox 1998-
i public ;• ' ~·  1999), but notin 
. : .. ¡cómpanies : . ·:e·.:~·· .· 2004 or 2005 
.e .i•; ·,¡ . ~ -· ~::..:·.: :· . '·'"> ··). ··>·.•· ·.·· '. 
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Gassen and Matched Whether the Reforms Audit fi rms 
Skaife [2009] sample of auditor issues mandated by were more 
(Archival) German public aGCO the German likely to issue 
companies government in GCOs following 
from 1996- the Act on theGerman 
1997 and 1999- Conttoland audit reforms of 
2000: 28 finn- Transparency 1998 
ycars rec.eiving of Enterprises 
modified 
opinions and 
844 fi rm-years 
recei ving e lean 
· opinions 
Feldmann 565 bankrupt Whether the Whether SOX Auditors are 
and Read U.S. public auditor issues is in effect more likely to 
[2010] companies wilh a OCO i~sue GCOs 
(Archiva!) audit reports 2002-2005 than 
dated 2000- 2000-2001, but 
2007 notas likely to 
issue GCOs 
2006-2007 
2.2 The Effects of Standards and Regulations on GCO Fonnation and Is-
suance 
2.2.1 The Effeéts of SAS Nos. 58 and 59 on GCO Formation and lssuance 
SAS No. 59' s issuance generated research investigating the ,effect of SAS 
No. 59 on auditors' GCO fonnation and issuance. In particular, much of tbe 
research focused on auditor propensity to issoe a GCO, and considered not only 
the impact of SAS No. 59, but also compárisons of SAS No. 59's effect with 
the effects of earlier standards (SAS Nos. 34 and 58) on GCO frequency and 
informati veness. 
qrtner and Dugan [1994] examined the effect of SAS No. 59 on U.S. audi-
tors' piopensity to issue GCOs. They found tbat non-Big N audit finns were 
more likely to issue GCOs after SAS No. 59 than before the standard, but re-
ported IJO. change in Big N audil finns' propensity to issue GCOs. Ragbunan-
dan and Rama [1995] found that, subsequent to SAS No. 59, auditors were 
more likely to issue GCOs prior to the company's failure. Carcello et al. [1995] 
compared the e.ffects of both SAS No. 34 [AICPA, 198l] and SAS No. 59 on 
Big N auditors~ propensity to issue GCOs. They found a higher frequency of 
GCOs following SAS No. 34, but no change in the frequency of GCOs follow-
itig SAS No. 59. Carcello et al. [1997] reconciled the apparently inconsistent 
results of Carcello et al. [1995] and Raghunandan and Rama [1995] concerning 
the jnfluence of SAS No. 59 on auditors' propensity to issue GCOs. Carcello et 
al. [1997] found that the difference between the earlier studies was an artifact 
of how each study managed the transition períod from the time SAS No. 59 
was releascd and the time at which the new standard became effective (April, 
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1988-December 30, 1989). Carcello et al. (1997] concluded that the handling of 
this transition period is critical to researcn on the effects of SAS No. 59. 
Schaub and Highfield [2003] investigated the information content of the 
provisions of SAS Nos. 58 and 59 that replaced the "subject-to" modiíication 
for GCOs with a modified unqualified opinion. They found that thc opinion 
name change had no effect on the informativeness of GCOs. Carce11o et al. 
[2003] extended this literamre by investigating differences in the language 
auditors selected when issuing GCOs under SAS No. 59. Carcello et al. [2003] 
i'ound that auditors use non-standard language, r~ther than boilerplate, in GCOs 
associated with longer auditor tenure, less client distress, and companies with 
lower probabilities of filing for bankruptcy. Thus, Carcello et al. [2003] suggest 
tbat auditors used non-standard language when they believed the client could 
.. recover from its going concem difficu!ties. 
, In other jurisdictions, Citron and Taffler [2004] examined the effects of 
changes in U.K. standards similar to SAS Nos. 58 and 59 on auditors' propen-
sity to issue GCOs. They found an increase in GCOs following the change in 
the options for reporting GCOs from the "subject to" opinion to a modífied 
unqualified opinion, but no change in GCOs following the standard increasing 
auditors' responsibilities conceming going concem assessments. Conceming 
audit tinn size, Citron <md Tafi1er [2004] found that Big N audítors were more 
likely to use the new repmt format (explanatory paragraph rather than a "sub-
ject to" opinion) during the transition phase befare the new report format be-
came mandatory. Farrugia and Baldacchino [2005] examined whether the 
.wordi:ng of GCOs complies with international auditing standards. They found 
that the majority of GCOs in Malta typically use ambiguous wording tbat is 
~~1sutlicient based on international auditing st<mda.rds. 
2~2.2 The Effects of Laws and Regulations on GCO Formation and 
Issuance 
In addition to research on the effects of audiling standards, another body of 
literature sheds light on the effects of regulations on auditors' propensity to 
issue GCOs. Por example, researchers ha ve found that following the passage of 
the PSLRA [Geiger e l al., 2006; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2001] and the Secu-
rities Litigation Uniform Stanqards Act [Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002a] 
auditors were l.ess likely to issue GCOs, likely because these acts reduced audi-
tors' litígation exposure as discussed ln ~ection 2. 1. 
An emerging body of work has begun to investigate the impact of SOX on 
the propensity to· issue GCO. Geiger et al. [2005] found that subsequent to 
SOX, auditors were more likely to issue GCOs, e ven after controlling for client 
characteristics. Feldmann and Read · [201 0] extended this investigation to the 
2000-2007 time period and found that auditors were more likely to issue GCOs 
to bankrupt companíes in the 2002-2005 lime frame than in 2000-2001. How-
ever, this increase in GCOs post-SOX did not persist info the 2006-2007 period 
[Feldman and Read, 201 0]. Studies done in other jurisdictions provide qualita:. 
tively similar results that any increase in auditors ' propensity to issue GCOs 
folÍo'wing SOX might be short~lived. For instance, Fargher and Jiang [2008] 
found ·that auditors of Australian · companies were more likely to issue GCOs 
immediately after SOX in 2003 compared with the pre-SOX period 1998-1999. 
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Similar to Feldman and Re.ad [2010], the increase in GCOs in Australia did not 
persist long after SOX became effective [Fargher and Jiang, 2008] . This litera-
ture suggests that SOX yielded a temporaty increase in GCOs. . 
A further srudy in another jurisdiction suggests that German audlt reforms 
also intluence auditors' propensity to issue GCOs. The Gerrnan Act on Control 
and Transparency of Enterprises instituted several reforms, including changing 
the objective of the financia! statement audit from checking compliance with 
laws to identífying going concern unce1tainties and inaccurate financia} report-
ing [Gassen and Skaife, 2009]. Gassen and Skaife [2009] found that German 
auditors were more likely to issue GCOs following the reform act than befare 
its passage. Sirnilarly, audítors of Chinese firms were more likely Lo issue 
GCOs after the Chínese government ímplernented regulations conceming state-
owned enterprises, corporate disclosures, and public accounting practices 
[Chen et al., 2005]. 
Whíle these studies have answered certain questions abo1,1t the impact of 
SAS Nos. 58 and 59, as well as SOX, on auditors ' propensity to issue GCOs, 
maoy opporrunities for future research remain concerning standards, regula-
tions, and the formation of GCOs. For exarnple, while much has been learned 
from existing studies en SAS Nos. 58 and 59, most research [e.g., Citron and 
Taffler, 2004; Carcello et al., 1995; Raghunandan and Rama, 1995; Griner and 
Dugan, 1994] investigated short-term consequences of these standards. Future 
research could investigate whether the long-term effects of SAS Nos. 58 and 59 
on audit quality are similar to these short-term consequences. 
Another possibility for future research stems from a recent PCAOB con-
cept release that would potentially require partners to sigo the audit opinion 
[PCAOB, 2009]. Because other couatries such as Australia, ltaly, and Taiwan 
have similar requirements, research on this issue could provide evidence of 
how similar regulatory requirements intluence GCO formation rn different ju-
r.isdictions. For instance, would a partner be more conservative in GCO judg-
ments if he/she is rcquired to persona U y sign the audit opinion. 
Another. research opportunity could stem from the governrnent's response 
to the re~,;ent financia! collapse yields opportunities for future research. Por 
example, how do government actions such as bailouts int1uence goíng concern 
judgments and decisions? 
~.OAUDITORS' IDENTIFICATION AND FORMATION OF GCOS 
Om objective in this section is to review the literature that ínvestigates fac-
tors that influence auditors' decisions concerning wbether to issue a GCO 
¡:gther than rhe standard, unqual.ified opirúon. Client characteristics (section 3.1) 
indude s[ze, con){)rate governance, camings management, and press coverage. 
,We also revi~w issu~s concerning the forecasti ng of GCOs and bankruptcies 
(3.2) and audttor attnbutes (3.3) such as auditor economic incentives, auditor 
~ognitive processes, and auditor expertise. Thc issue in section 3.0 that receives 
the greatest amount of debate betweep.· papers. is the conflicting effects of audi-
~.ors' incentives for profitability and avoiding litigation. While some Jiterature 
~\lggests GCOs rcflect prot1tability incentives influence GCbs [e.g., Carey and 
Sunnett, 2006], other studies provide evidence that lüigation incentives ínflu-
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ence GCOs [e.g., Tucker el al. , 2003; Reynolds and Francis, 2001]. Table 2 
summarizes these srudies. 
TABLE 2: Form~tion of Audit Opinions (Section 3.0) 
Panel A: Cbaracteristics of Clients Receiving GCOs (Section 3. 1) 
Study Sample Dependent Independent Kcy Finding[s} (Method) Variable[s} Vnriablc[s] 
McKeown el 134 U.S. Whether Clienl size Auditors issued 
al. [1991] bankrupt the auditor relacivcly fewer 
(Archiva!) pub He issues a GCOs ro largcr 
companies and GCO clients 
a control compared to 
sample of 160 smaller clients 
: 
non-bankrupt 
companies 
from 
1974-1985 
Chen and 127U.S. Whether the Default status Auditors tended 
Church [1992] public auditor to issue GCOs 
" 
(Archival) companies that issues a co clients in 
received l'irst- GCO defaull of debt 
~ time GCOs covenants; 
from 1982- howcver, default 
1986 anda was not a good 
- matched indicator 
.,. 
sample of 127 bankruptcy 
non going 
concern 
companies 
LaSalle and 208 U.S. audit NIA NIA The client's 
Anandarajan partners from negative 
[1996] various types attributes were 
(Survey) of public more importanr 
accounting than its positive 
finns attributes when 
considering 
issuing a GCO; 
auditor lit igation 
risk provides 
incentive to 
issue a GCO 
70 Joumal of Accormti11g Literature Volume 29 
Mutchler el al. 208 U.S. Whether the Press coverage Wal l Street 
[1997J public auditor and client JoumaJ 
(Archiva!) companies issues a violations of coverage of 
entering GCO loan covenant client debt 
bankruptcy covenanl 
from 1974- violations and 
1985 and payment 
1990-1994 · defaults was 
positively 
associated with 
the frequency of 
GCOs 
Louwers 806 stressed Whether the Auditor Auditors focus 
[1998] U.S. public auditor economic on client 
(Archiva!) companies issues a incentives c!ulracteristics 
from 1984- GCO and distress 
1991 ' · ralhcr than 
auditor 
economic 
incentives or 
litigation risk 
when evaluating 
clients as going 
concerns 
Francis and 2,608 Whether the Magnitude of Audilors were 
Krishnan observations auditor accruals more líkely to 
[ 1999] from U.S. issues a issue GCOs for 
(Archiva!) public GCO high-accrual 
companies, t-i rms thnn for 
1986-1987 low-accrual 
finns 
Rosman et al. 13 audit Going Stage of · financ.ial health 
[1 999] seniors and 10 concern organizational and stage of 
(Experimental} audit managers judgment development developmem 
from four Big (start-t1p, both impact 
6 firms mature), auditors' 
financia! acquisition or 
health nonfinancial and 
(bankrupt, financia! 
non-bankrupt) information; 
Correct going 
concern 
judgments are 
associated wi tb 
acquisition of 
less information 
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Behn et al. 148 Whether the Management GCOs are not 
[200 1] manufacturing auditor plans to sell a associated with 
(Archiva!) firms receiving issues a significant management' s 
GCOs from GCO ¡¡mount of plans to redt1ce 
1992 to 1995, equiry, bonow spending, but 
and 148 money, and are influenced 
"stressed" non- reduce by 
GCO firms spending management' s 
from the same plans to sell 
Lime period equity and/or 
borrow money 
Carcello and 223 distressed Whether the Distressed In verse 
Neal [2000] U.S. public auditor clients' audit relationship 
(Archiva!) companies issues a committee between 
~ during 1994 GCO proportion of proportion of 
affiliuted ufriliated 
directors directors and 
auditors' 
propensity to 
issue GCOs 
Reynolds and 2,439 Whether the Client size and At the local 
.:. Francis [2001] distressed U.S. auditor financia] ratios office leve!, 
(Archiva!) public issues a auditors were 
companies GCO more likely to 
audited by the issue a GCO lo 
-
Big 5 relaLively large 
~ clients 
Sharma and 49 Austra!ian Whelher Lhe Non-audit Auditors were 
Sidhu [2001] companies that auditor fees, financia] less likely to 
(Archiva!) went bankrupt issues a distress issue a GCO to 
from I989- GCO clients that pay 
1996 relatively high 
non-audit 
service fees and 
to clients with 
low Altman 
•' .. Z-scores 
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Ireland j2003] 9,304 U.K. Whether the 1 Client Large clients 
(Archiva!) pub líe auditor characteristics were less likely 
companies issues a to receive orher 
from 1998 GCO modified 
opinions, but 
were more 
Jikely to receive 
GCOs; Large 
auditors were 
more Jikely to 
issue GCOs; no 
firm size effect 
on other 
modified 
opinions 
Joe [2003J 90 in-¡;harge Vinbility Whether there , Negative press 
(Experimental) auditor::; from (conlinue, was press coverage 
one fail); Audi r covernge of increased the 
international opinion loan default likelihood 
pu blic (dean, info~mation audiwrs will 
accounting GCO, issue a GCO 
firm disdaimer); 
oc 
probability 
eslimate; 
Perceived 
audi t 
litigation 
risk 
Butler et al. 7,093 firm- WhetJ1er the Abnormal GCO clients 
12004) year auditor accruals have Jarge 
(Archiva)) observations issues a · .negali ve 
from oc o accruals that are 
Compustat likely due to 
firms severe finnncial 
(excluding distress rather 
ulilities and than earnings 
· financia! management 
services firms) 
that reccived 
GCOs between 
1994 and 1.999. 
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Carey and 1,021 Whether the Audit partner Client size is not 
Simnelt l2006] Australian auditor teuure a signil'icnnt 
(Archiva!) public issues a variable in 
companies in · GCO predicting 
1995 propensity Lo 
issue a GCO for 
Australian 
financially-
distressed 
companies 
Arnedo et al. 1,261 firm- Whethcr thc Discretionary Companies with 
[2008] year auditor accruals GCOs were 
(Archival) observations of issues a more likely to 
Spanish GCO have lower 
. ~ bankruptcy- discretionary 
fil ing accrullls, while 
companies, companies with 
1993-2002 olher 
qualifications 
were more 
likely lo have 
higber 
discretionary 
- accruals 
Basioudis et aL 29 fi nancially Whether the Non-audit fees No significan! 
. . [2008] distressed auditor and audit fees con·elation 
.. (Archiva!) public U .K. issues a between clienl 
' 
companies GCO size and GCO 
-
with GCOs, 
2003, anda 
matched 
sarnple of 
fi nanciall y 
distressed 
companies 
without GCOs 
Carey et al. 68 financially Auditor. Whether the Companies 
[2008] distressed change company receiving GCOs 
(Archiva!) Australian received a were of similar 
companies first-time size compared 
with GCOs, GCO;CPA to companies 
1994-1997, finn size that did no! 
and a matched receive GCOs 
sample of 
distressed 
companies 
without GCOs 
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Herbolm and Matched Whether the Accruals, Negative GCO-
Ragunathan sample of60 auditor persisten ce, accruals relation 
[2008] Australian issues a and financia! that is driven by 
(Archiva!) companies GCO distress GCO f irms due 
with GCOs and to their greater 
60 with other financia! 
modified distress and 
opinions audit litigation 
risk. 
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Panel B: GCOs and Forecasting Bankruptcies (Section 3.2) 
Study Sample Dependent lndcpendent Key (Method) Va riable[s] Variable[s] Findin_g[s] 
Bell and 131 Whether the ROl, inventory Return on 
Tabor [1991] observations auditor issues intensi veness, investment, 
(Archiva)) from U.S. aOCO receivables short-term 
public intensiveness, liquidity, 
companies short-term leverage, 
that received liquidity, and inventory-to-
GCOs from financia! sales, and 
1979-1984 and leverage recei v ab tes-to-
a matched in ventory can 
sample of be used to 
1,367 forecust 
companies GCOs 
with clean 
opinions 
Koh [1991) 165 brulkrupt Conditi.onal Financia! ratios Bankruptcy 
(Archiva!) companies and probability of prediction 
165 matched non- models can be 
non-b~nkrupt bankruptcy useful to 
companies audilors in 
from 1978- making going 
1985 concem 
assessments 
. Chen and 127 u.s . Whether the Default status, Auditors 
Church public auditor issues financia! ratios tended to issue 
[1992] companies that aOCO GCOs to 
(Archival) received first- clients in 
timeGCOs default of debt 
from 1982- covenants; 
1986 anda however, 
matched default was 
sample of 127 nota good 
non going indicator 
con e e m bankruptcy 
companies 
Citron and 107 failed Whether tbe Whether auditor No support for 
Taffler [1992) U.K. client fails issues a GCO self-fulfilling 
(Archiva]) companies, subsequent to propbecy, as 
~977- 1986 GCO only 24 
percent of 
1 clients 
receiving 
OCOs failed. 
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Bíggs et al. 1 partner and GCO Financia! The auditor' s 
[1993] 1 manager judgment knowledge, intimate 
(lnterviews) from an event knowledge of 
intemational knowledge, client 
publlc procedural operations and 
accounting knowledge industry was 
firm important in 
deciding 
whether to 
issue a GCO 
Hopwood et 118 stressed U nconditional Estimated Auditors' 
a!. [1994] and 16 non- probability misclassificalion abiliry to 
(Archiva!) stressed U.S. that company cost identify 
bankrupt will be distressed 
public incorrectly elients was 
companies and classified as equivalent to 
a control non-bankrupt that of the 
sample of 80 (bankrupt), bank:rtlptcy 
stressed and weighted by models 
80 non- cost of 
-stressed non- misclassi fying 
bankiuptcy bankrupt 
U.S. public (non-
companies bankrupt) 
from 1974- firmas non-
1985 bankrupt 
(bankrupt) 
Cormier et al. 138 companies GCO Client 'Coml>ining 
[1995] racing prediction quanti.tative and both 
(Archiva!) financia! qualitati.ve quantitative 
difficulties and characteristics and qualitarive 
112 non- · characteristícs, 
failing Logit, 
companies. discriminant 
analysis, and 
recursi ve 
parútioning 
models all 
pro vide 
consistent 
predictive 
abili ties 
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Lenard et al. 40 U.S. public Whether the Ratio of cash Tite nellral 
[1995] companies that auditor issues tlow frorn network model 
(Archiva!) received aOCO operac ions to using a 
GCOs fTom totalliabilities; generalized 
1982-1987, Currenl ratio; reduced 
and a matched Ratio ofnet gradient 
sample of worth to total (GRG2) 
unqualified liabilities; Ratio oplimizer had 
opinion of long-term the highest 
companies debt to total prediction 
assets; Ratio of accuracy at 
totalliabilities 95 percent 
to total assets; 
~ Ratio of net income befare 
laxes to net 
sales; Ratio of 
net income lo 
total assets; 
Whether the 
company had a 
priory_ear loss 
~Geiger et al. 153 u.s. Whether Lhe Presence or First-time 
e- [1998j pubJic company absence of a GCOs are 
(Archiva\) companies that filed for tirst-time, associated 
.- received a bankruptcy undeserved, with a higher 
-
first-time GCO Jikelihood of 
; GCOfrom bankruptcy 
199{)-199 1 and than non-GCO 
a control companies 
sample of 197 
non-GCO 
stressed 
companies 
Foster et al. 126 (95) Whether the Loan defaults, GCOs are not 
[1998] bankruplcy company filed debt covenant n significant 
(Archiva)) (non- for violations, and predictor ·of 
bankruptcy) bankruptcy GCO status bankruptcies if 
U.S. public the forecasting 
companies model also 
from 1988- includes loan 
1993 defau lts and 
debt covenant 
! violations 
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Lennox 160quoted Whether the Number ofU.K. The audl! 
[1999] UK companies company quoted report did not 
(Archiva!) from 1987- failed (issued companies in signal useful 
1994 that final annual population that incremental 
entered report a year entered informatíon 
administr.ttion, befo re bankruptcy that . about the 
liquidation or bankruptcy) year, changes in probability of 
receivership. business bankruptcy 
confidence, when 
industry, controlling for 
. number of public 
employees, information 
financia! ratios about the 
economic 
cycle, 
' 
company size, 
~ and industry 
sector 
Louwers et al. 231 public Whether the Time since frrst- Bankniptcy is 
{1999] companies that client enters time GCO most likely in 
(Archlval) received first- bankruptcy the first year 
time GCOs, following a 
19&4-1991 first-time 
GCO 
Casterella et lOO publicly Whether the Predicted Auditors were 
al. [2000) traded auditor issues probability of unable to 
(Archiva!) companies that aOCO bankruptcy predict fi lings 
filed for resolution or resolutions 
bankruptcy of 
during the bankruptcies 
period 1982-
1992 
Lenard et al. 58 U.S. GCO Fuzzy clustering Whlle both 
[2000] bankrupt U.S . prediction compared with a models were 
(Archival) public Hybrid system high.ly 
companies accurate, the 
from 1989- hybrid model 
1990, anda displayed 
matched superior 
sample of non- . predictive 
bankrupt ability; the 
companies fuzzy clusters 
cannot be used 
on a company-
by-company 
basis 
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Riley el al. !35 firms Whether the Management Resulls 
[2000) receiving auditor issues actions such as suggest that 
(Archiva!) GCOs from a follow-up sales of assets, management 
1989 to 1992. GCO issuance of new action 
debt, and variables 
employee provide 
layoffs incremental 
information 
beyond that 
! provided by 
sununary 
financia! 
; . statement ratio 
me asures 
·· ' Arnold et al. 44 upper-level GCO lnsolvcncy Auditors did 
[2001) and 41 lower- judgment expertisc not possess 
(Case study) leve] sufficient 
insolvency expertise 
expcrts from concerning 
Australia clienl 
insolvency to 
properly 
' consider non-
.. financia! 
information in 
GCO 
- judgmenls 
Behn et al. 148 Whether the Management GCOs are not 
[200 1] manufacturing auditor issues plans to sell a associated 
(Archival) firms aOCO significant wil'h 
receiving amount of management' s 
GCOs from equity, bon·ow plans lo 
1992 to 1995, money, and reduce 
and 148 reduce spendíng spending, but 
"stressed" are influenced 
non-GCO by 
fmns from the managen1ent' s 
same time plans to sell 
period equity and/or 
borrow money 
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Cítron and 124 Whether the Whether the Companies 
Taffler [2001] índependent company filed auditor issues a whose auditors 
(Archiva)) non-financia! for GCO disclosed 
companies that bankruptcy going concern 
entered uncertainties 
bankruptcy are no more 
from 1987- likely to fail 
1994 than those 
without such 
disclosures 
Tucker et al. 160 students at Whetherthe Self-fulfill ing When the 
[2003] a large U.S. auditor issues prophecy and inítial forecas t 
(Experimental midwestern aGCO forecast suggested 
Economics) uuiversity inaccuracy business 
failure, 
·auditors 
typically 
- sacrificed 
future profits 
and issued 
GCOs 
Vanstraelen ·392 large Whether the Time frame wilb Clients were 
[2003] Belgian company filed respect to end of four times 
(Archiva!) companies for 3-year more likely to 
. from 1992- bankruptcy mandatory audit switch 
1996 including firrn retention auditors at the 
bankrupt, period end of the 
stressed and mandatory 
non-stressed term if they 
received a 
GCO in the 
final year of 
the Belgian 
mandatory 
three-year 
retention 
period 
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Nogler [2004) 55 companies Whether Status of Auditors are 
(Archiva!) that auditor is company: active correct to 
successfully correct to and publicly- remove GCO 
resolved remove GCO traded, in the majority 
GCOs, 1985- bankruptcy filer, of case, as 7 1 
1991, and a merged, percent f 
matched acquired, or resolv~(iCO 
sample of gone prívate, clients remain 
non-GCO and gone out of a e ti ve or were 
companies business acquired-
most c lients 
who 
successfully 
resolve GCOs 
1 
do not appear 
~ 
subject to self-
fulfilling 
prophecy. 
Carey et al. 68 financially Auditor Whether the Companies 
f2008] distressed change company receiving a 
(Archiva!) Australian received a first- GCO were 110 
companies time GCO; CPA more likely to 
with GCOs, fmn size fail than 
1994-1997, companies not 
-- and a matched receiving a 
sampleof GCO. 
distressed 
companies 
without GCOs 
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Panel C: Audilor Characteristics (Section 3 .3) 
Study Sample Dependent 
Independent Key 
(lvl etlwd) Variable[s] Variable[s] Finding[s] 
Mutchler ::md 1,870 u.s. Whether the DISCRIM When the 
Williams public auditor issues (general audit process 
[1990) companies aGCO propensity in volved 
(Archiva!) in 1987 of any company highly-
to receive a stmctured use 
GCO} and· of tcchnology, 
TRlSK (total auditors have 
returns variance more difficulty 
of a company's reaching a 
stock over 24 cansen sus 
month prior concerning 
period) 'whether a 
GCO is 
- appropriate 
Ponemon and 86 audit Perception of Client financia! Six 
Schick [199 1] managers clienl based on condition (good/ characteristics 
(Survey) from one 12 decline healthy or poor/ associated 
· national characteristics distrcssed) more with 
public (centralization, distressed 
accounting no long-term firms: no long-
ftrm planning, ., term planning, 
innovation scapegoating, 
curtailed, tumover, low 
scapegoating, morale, loss of 
resistance to sla.ck, and 
. 
change, non-prioritized 
tumover, low cuts 
morale, loss of 
slack, 
frngmented 
pluralism, ioss 
of credibi li ty, 
non-prioritized 
cuts, and 
conflict) 
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Asare [ 1992] 70 audit Difference Order of Auditors <u·e 
(Experimental parrners and between evidence susceptible to 
) managers initial (contrary recency effect 
f'rorn four judgment and m.itigating when 
Big 6 public judgment versus considering 
accounting after relevant mitigating whetller to 
firms pieces of contrary); issue a goiJ1g 
evidence Framing of concem 
llave been inilial opinion; 
evaluated; hypothesis recency frame 
Type of (either a failure was present 
opinion 
or viable for both issued 
hypothesis hypothesis 
condition frames (fai lure 
;·~ or viable 
cl.ient) 
Ricch.iute 100 audit GC Order in which Participnnts 
[1992] partners from judgments evidence were more 
(Experimental one firm received (causal (less) Iikely Lo 
) or working- conclude a 
paper arder); GCO was 
Whether 
-
appropriate 
evidence when strongest 
supports a evidencc for a 
·- GCO GCOwas 
received in 
.... causal 
-
(working- ' 
-. 
paper) arder 
Bonner[I994] Published GCO Task Judgment Differences 
(Experimental) formation complexity performance in task 
studies that complexity 
u sed across GCO 
experimental experiments 
methodologies likely account 
for so me of 
the differences 
in results 
among these 
studies 
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Carcello and 655 public Auditor Presence and GCOs were 
Palmrose companies litigation persistence of useful in 
[1994] that declared GCOs lirn iting, 
(Archiva!) bankruptcy defending, and 
from 1972 to weakeniug 
1992 that plaintiffs 
were with Big claims against 
8 companies . auditors when 
ciients declare 
ban.kruptcy 
Ho [1994] 156 auditors GCO Months of audit Auditors with 
(Experimental from four judgments experience both high and 
) international low levels of 
public experience 
accounting fai led to reach 
firms a consensus 
-
concenúng 
going concern 
judgments 
Choo [1996] 58 audítors Líkelihood Knowledge Experience 
(Experimental from that company distinctiveness, helps auditors 
) · intemational would remain knowledge identify 
accounting a going abstractness, atypical audit 
firms concern knowledge events, which 
contingency influences 
auditors' GCO 
judgments 
more than 
typical events; 
Auditors who 
exhibit larger 
extent of 
knowledge 
abstractness 
make belter 
GCO 
_iudgments 
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LaSalle and 208 U.S. audit N! A N/A The client's 
Anandarajan partners from negalive 
[1996] various types attributes 
(Survey) ofpublic weremore 
accounting important than 
firms its positive 
attributes 
when 
considering 
issuing a 
GCO; auditor 
litigation risk 
provides 
incentive t.o 
·, issue aGCO 
LaSa11e et al. 183 U.S. audit Opinion type Auditor's Auditors 
[ !996] partners frorn used to experience, CPA tended to 
(Experimental various types express GCO frrm size, Public select 
) of public vs. prívate disclaimers 
accounting campan y, when litigation 
firms Company's risk is higher, 
- total asscts and when 
clients have a 
-
greater 
proportion of 
< 
negative 
attributes than 
positive 
attributes 
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Louwers 806 stressed Whether the Client going Auditors focus 
[1998] U.S. public auditor issues concern on client 
(Archival) companies aGCO disclosure; characteristics 
from 1984- estimmed and distress 
1991 bankruptcy rather than 
probability of auditor 
client; audit econonúc 
tirm's clients incentives or 
lost during the litigation risk 
previous year; when 
number of years evaluating 
auditing firm clients as 
has been going 
engaged by concerns 
client; presence 
of either 
-. publicly-
disclosed debt 
defanlt on debt 
covenants or 
significan! 
uncertainties 
involving client, 
alleged damages 
tiled in audit 
failure litigation 
against auditing 
fi rm in the 
previous year, 
client financia! 
condition 
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Rau and 120 seniors Likelihood to Other task When 
M o ser [ 1999] from Big 5 issue GCO (posilive, provided with 
(Experiment) accounting negntive, an identical set 
firms and control) of 
infonnation, 
seni ors who 
perfonned 
another audil 
task for which 
the underlying 
facts of the 
case retlected 
positively 
(negati vel y) 
~- on the 
·' 
compuny' s 
viability, 
1 subsequently 
made going 
concern 
judgments that 
~; were relatively 
; more positive 
-
(ncgative) 
Carcello et al. 316U.S. Whether the Partner Partners with 
[2000) public auditor issues compensation compensation 
·-(Archiva!) companies aOCO plan and client plans with 
bctween size emphasis on 
1987-1991 local office 
profits were 
more sensitive 
lo client size 
when deciding 
whether to 
issue a GCO 
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Anandarajan 523 U.S. Opinion type Client size and Under going 
et aL (2001] public used to fmancíal ratios con e e m 
(Archiva!) companies express uncertainties, 
in 1996 GCO auditors were 
more líkely to 
issue a 
disclaimer 
than add an 
explanatory 
pacagraph to 
an unqualified 
opinion to 
larger clients, 
when auditor 
1enure was 
shorter, and 
- client financia! 
stress was 
greater 
Geiger and 383 bankrupt Whether the Whether PSLRA . Auditors were 
Raghunandan . companies auditor issues is in effect less likely to 
[2001} from 1991 aOCO issue prior 
(Archiva!) to 1998 GCOs for 
b'ankrupt 
companies 
after the 
passage of 
the Prívate 
Securities 
Litiga !ion 
Reform Act 
of 1995 
Reynolds and 2,439 Whether the Client size and At the local 
Francis [2001] distressed auditor issues financia! ratios office level, 
(Archiva!) U.S. public aOCO auditors were 
companies more tikely to 
audited by the issue a GCO 
Big 5 to relatively 
large clients 
. 1 
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Sharma and 49 bankrupt Whether the Altman z- score; Auditors wcre 
Sidhu [2001] Australian auditor issues Ratio of non- less likely to 
(Archival) companies aGCO audit fees to issue a GCO 
from 1989- total fees to clients that 
1996 pay relativety 
high non-audit 
service fees 
and to clients 
withlow 
Altman 
Z-scores 
Ashton and 135 staff GC Task processing A self-review 
¡ ~ennedy auditors judgmenls (step-by-step technique 
[2002] from one judgments, eliminaled 
... (Experimental Big 5 public end-of-sequence recency effect 
)' accounting judgment, or in staff 
firm judgments with auditors' 
debiaser going concern 
decision aid) judgments 
DeFond et al. 1,158 Whether the Ratio of non- GCOs did not 
·-(2002] financially auditor issues audit fees lo relate to audit 
(Archi val) distressed aGCO total fees; Audit fees, non-audit 
~- companies and non-audit fees, total fees, 
in 2001 fees paid or the ratio of 
non-audit to 
-
total fees 
Geiger and 1,871 U.S. Whether the Regulatory GCOs were 
~Raghunandan public auditor issues · change less likely 
[2002a] companies aOCO after each 
(Archiva!) under successive 
fmancial regulatory 
stress during change 
1992-1993, 
1996-97, and 
1999-2000 
Oeiger and 171 public Whether t~e Auditor tenure .Auditors are 
Raghunandan companies auditor issues less likely to 
[2002b] th<it filed for aOCO issue OCOs as 
(.Archíval) bankruptcy, auditor tenure 
1996-1998 increases 
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Vanstraelen 392 Jarge Whether the Audit fees; Auditors were 
[2002] bankrupt auditor issues Ratio of number less Jikely to 
(Archiva!) Belgian aGCO of clients lost or issue a GCO 
compmlies gained by audit to clients that 
rrom 1992- finn during pay relatively 
1996, anda previous year to high audit fees 
matched annual number and when the 
sample of or firm clients audit firm had 
non-bankrupl recently lost 
companies market share 
Geigcr and 66 financially Whether the Audit fees; Non- Companíes 
Rama [2003] distressed auditor issues audit fees w ith higher 
(Archiva!) manufacturing aGCO audit fees 
companies were more 
wilh GCOs l.i kely to 
and year-ends receive 
September 30, GCOs t.han 
2000- companies 
February 28, with lower 
2001 , anda audit fees, 
matched however 
sample of neither non-
financially audit fees nor 
distressed the ratio of 
manufacturing non-audit fees 
companies to audit fees 
without GCOs relate to 
GCOs 
Ire land [2003] 9,304 U.K. Whether the Client size and Large clients 
(Archiva!) pub líe auditor issues CPA firm size were less 
companies aGCO likely lo 
from 1998 receive ot.her 
modified 
opinions, but 
.. wcrc more 
likely to 
receive GCOs; 
Large auditors 
were more 
likely to issue 
GCOs 
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Tuckeretal. 160 students Whether the Self-fulfilling When the 
[2003] ata large auditor issues prophecy and initial forecast 
(Experimental midwestern aOCO forecast suggested 
Economics) university inaccuracy business 
failure, 
auditors 
typically 
sacrificed 
future profits 
and issued 
GCOs 
Vanstraelen 392large Whether the Time frame wilh Clients were 
! [2003] compmlies company respect to end of four times 
(Archiva!) from 1992- filed for 3-year more Jikely to 
~ 
, .. . 1996 bankruptcy mandatory audit switch 
íncluding tirm retention auditors al rhe 
bankmpt, period end of the 
stressed and mandatory 
non-stressed term ifthey 
received a 
GCO in the 
-- final year of 
1 a mandatory 
~ - (Belgium) 
three-year 
retention 
period 
Weberand 233 Pre-JPO GCO CP A firm size Big 6 firms 
--
Willenborg nonventure- issued and and coverage more likely 
[2003] backed stock delists (e.g., local issue pre-JPO 
(Archival) microcap within 2 years versus national); GCOs and 
IPOs, 1993- ofiPO OR Audít firm pre-IPO 
1994 Prc-IPO non- (indicator opinions are 
GCOand variable for each more 
stock is not of Big 6 firms) informa ti ve 
delisted about 
within 2 years post-IPO 
ofiPO performance 
92 Journal of Accotmting Lileramre Volume 29 
Blay [2005] 48 audit Whether the Threats lo Auditors were 
(Experimental managers auditor issues independence more (Jess) 
) from three Big aGCO (more/less) and likely to issue 
4 firm risk of litigation GCOs when 
(high/low) the threat of 
losing the 
client is low 
(high), and 
when l.itigatíon 
risk is high 
(low) 
Geigeret al. 226 bankrupt Whether the Whether audit Auditors were 
[2005] companies auditor issues opinion issued more likely lo 
(Archiva!) from 2000- aOCO after 12/31/2001 issue GCOs 
2003 . afte r 
December 31 , 
'· 2001 (SOX) 
Wertheim and 696 Chapter Whether the Auditor type Non-BigN 
Fowler [2005] 11 bankrupt auditor issues {Big N or not) firms were 
(Archiva!) companies aGCO more likely to 
between issue GCOs 
1997-2001 than Big N 
frrms 
Favere- 109 partners Belief Temporal . Auditors 
Marchesi and 71 senior revísions evidence arder ex.hibited 
[2006} managers (indicative of recency effecl 
(Experimental from six favorable trend, bias when 
) largesl U .S. iudicative of evaluating 
accounting unfavorable trend, going concem 
finns or no temporal evidence; 
order); Evidence Varying 
presentation order temporal order 
( negative/posi ti ve and 
or presentation 
positive/negative) lessened the 
' 
recency effect 
Geiger el al. 694 bankrupt Whether the Regime (pre- or Auditors' 
[2006] U.S. public auditor issues post- PSLRA); propensity to 
(ArchivHl) companies aOCO Auditor typ·e issue GCOs 
fmrn 199 I - (Big N or not) decreased 
2001 following the 
Private 
Securities 
Litigation 
Reform Act, 
especially 
amongBigN 
auditors 
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Geiger and 1 1 ,042 first- ¡ The Whether the No11-Big N 
Rama [2006] 1 time GCOs, probability of at1ditor is Big N firms have 
(Archiva!) 1 1990-2000 Type l and higher Type I 
and 710 Type ll audit and Type JI 
public error& error rates 
companies involving involving 
that filed for GCOs GCOs than 
bankruptcy, Big N firms 
1991-2001 
Guiral and 81 Spanish Belief When audit. Recency effect 
Esteo [2006] auditors and revision and reports were such that 
(Experimental 104 graduate audil reporL processed; auditors who 
) audit students Whether read positive 
auditors information 
J believed the about the 
framework was client at Lhe 
viable or not; end of the 
Auditor information 
experience :;et were less 
likely to issue 
go¡ng concern 
opinions; audit 
experience did 
-
not mitigate 
recency effect 
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Lam and 148 Hong Opinion type Bond and bank In a low 
Mensah Kong public used to defaultibank litigation: risk 
[2006] companies express credit environment, 
(Archiva!) receiving GCO withdrawal; auditors 
GCO, 1998- Controlling tended to issue 
2000 shareholders' or disclaimers of 
holding opin.ion rather 
companies' than modified 
assets being unqualified 
frozen by the opinions as 
state or the financia! 
leading bank; di stress 
Refusal of increases 
furt11er support 
by state 
governmenl or 
- controlling 
sbareholders; 
Appointment of 
liquidator by 
major 
creditors/major 
creditor initiated 
winding up; 
Partition/princip 
al ban.ks 
submitted writs 
and deman.ds for 
repayment; 
Failure to meet 
restructuring 
(recovery) 
agreement 
Carey and 1,021 Whether the Audit partner In verse 
Simnetl Australian auditor issues tenure relation 
[20061 public aGCO between 
(Archiva!) companies in auditor tenure 
1995 and Hkelihood 
auditor wiU 
issue a GCO 
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LaS aH e NIA NIA N/A Suggests that 
[2006] when litigalion 
(Discussion of risk is low, 
Lam and 1 auditors may 
Mensah, 1 issue 
1 1 2006) 1 disclaimers ln l convey GCOs 
because the 
profitable 
auditor-client 
relationship is 
unlikely to 
continue, and 
the auditor 
-~ essentially has 
little Lo lose by 
disclaiming an 
opinion 
Ettredge et al. Auditor Whether the Whether the The presence 
[2(}07] dismissals clienl auditor issues a of a GCO is 
(Archiva!) announced dismisses the GCO positively 
- from January auditor associated 
. through with auditor 
- December dismissals 
2004 
Hunt and 996 firm-year Whether the Financia] A higher 
~•;lseged observations auditor issues dislress; CPA proportion of 
[2007] of financially aGCO firm size; Finn polentially 
'(Archiva!) distressed economic financially 
companies dependence on distressed 
with non-Bíg the client clients of aon-
N auditors, Big 5 auditors 
2001-2003 receive going 
concem 
reporls, and 
that non-Big 5 
auditors are· 
not less, if not 
more, likely to 
issue a GCO 
to their larger 
clients 
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Knechel nnd 309 prívate Whether the Length of Auditor tenure 
Vanstraelen bankrupt auditor issues auditor/client does not 
[2007] stressed aGCO relationship; impact the 
(Archiva!) Belgian Indicator líkeW10od that 
companies, variable if auditors issue 
1992-!996, auditor tenure GCOs 
and rnalched gremer than 
sample of 3 years 
non-bankrupt 
stressed 
companies 
Basioudis et 29 financially Whether the Non-audit fees Companies 
al. [2008] distressed auditor issues and audit fees with higher 
(Archiva!) public U .K. aGCO 
' 
non-audi t 
companies (audit) fees 
with GCOs, were less 
2003, anda (more) likely 
marched to receive 
sample of GCOs 
financially 
. distressed 
companies 
wilhout GCOs 
Carey eL al. 68 financially Auditor Whether the Companies 
[2008] distressed change company receiving 
(Archiva!) Australian received a GCOs were 
companies first-time GCO; more likely to 
with GCOs, CP A firm size switch audit 
1994-1997, finns than 
and a matched companies not 
sample of receiving 
distressed GCOs 
companies 
without GCOs 
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Lim and Tan 1,692 Whether the Non-audit fees; Greater non-
[2008] distressed auditor issues Client' s audit fees 
(Archiva!) firm-year aGCO percentile rank increase 
observations, 1 of non-audit fees industry 
2000-2001 given audit specialists' 
firm's to tal fees; likelihoodto 
Total fees; issue GCOs, 
Industry but not non-
1 
specialization as specialisl:'l' 
(1) continuous likelihood lo 
mensure of issue GCOs 
mnrket share, 
> (2) largest 
J 
markel share 
and at least LO% 
higher than 
second lnrgest 
auditor, and 
(3) market share 
greater than or 
equal to 24% 
Robinson 209 firms Whether the Tax sen•ice fees The Jevel of 
rioo&J filing for auditor issues tax serv ices 
-{-Archival) Chapter ll a GCO provided by an 
bankruptcy audi! fi.rm for 
·-
an audit client 
was positively 
associated 
.. 
with the audit 
fi rrn 's 
likelihood of 
issuing a 
correctGCO 
Callaghan 92 Whether the · Audit fees; Non- Auditors' 
et al. [2009] bankruptcy- auditor íssues audit fees; Ratio likelihood to 
(Archival) filing U.S. aGCO · of non-audit fees issue GCOs 
companies, to total audit díd not relate • 
1 January 1, fees to non-audit 
2001-March fces; audit 
16, 2005 fees, total fees, 
or the ratio of 
non-audit LO 
total fees 
' 
1. 
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Lai [2009] 3,642 firm- Whether lhe Pre/Post fee Audit finus 
(Archiva!) year audilor issues disclosure were more 
observalions aOCO requirements likely to issue 
of financialiy mandated by the GCOs when 
distressed SEC (in 2000) there is 
companies, required 
June 1, 1999- disclosure of 
June 30, 2002 fees than when 
there is not 
required fee 
disclosure 
Li [2009] 1,681 Whether the Ratio of client Post-SOX, 
(Archiva)} distressed auditor issues aurut fees to auditors are 
companies in aGCO office total more likely to 
2001 and revenue; Ratio issue GCOs 
1,780 of client non- for clients 
distresseo audit fces to with relatively 
companies in office total greater 
2003 revenue; Ratio proportion of 
of client total audit fees at 
fees to office the audit fi rm 
total revenue office level 
Reichelt and 2!,583 Whetber the Auditor Auditors with 
Wang2010 lirm-year auditor issues expenise industry 
(Archiva!) observalions aGCO experlise are 
ofnon- more lik.ely to 
tinancial issue GCOs 
domestic 2003 
to 2007 
3.1 Characteristics of Clients Receiving GCOs 
If compani:es that receive a GCO share similar characteristics, identifying 
those characteristics could help auditors and stakeholders foresee a company's 
going concem. Prior resem·ch generaJly suggests that a set of specific client 
characteristics are associated with GCOs; even to such an ·extent that Louwers 
[1998] suggested tbat auditors focus on client characteristics and distress rather 
than auditor economic incentives or litigation risk wben evaluating clients as a 
going concern. GCO clients tend to be in violation of debt covenants [Chen and 
Church,, 1992] and have Iow Altman Z-scores [Shanna and Sidhu, 2001]; how-
ever, Behn et aL [2001] found that auditors' going concem reporting decisions 
are associated with management' s voluntarily disclosed plans to alleviate fi-
nancia! distress (i.e., increase ownership equity, bonow money or restructure 
debt, and reduce spending or dispose ·of assets). Rosman et al. [1999] found 
that whether the client is bankrupt ahd whether the client is a start-up or a ma-
ture company influences the extent of auditors' evidence collection when 
evaluating GCOs. Concerning evidence evaluation, negative client attributes 
are more intluential than positive attributes [LaSalle and Anandarajan, 1996]. 
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Other research has examined the relationship between client size and 
GCOs. For instance, evidence from the U.K. suggests that large client:s are 
more likely to receive GCOs than small clients [lreland, 2003]. However, 
Carey et al. [2008] and Basioudis et al. [2008] both report no relation between 
companies (in Australia and the U.K., respectively) receiving GCOs and firm 
size, while larger firms in the U.S. appem· less 1ikely to receive GCOs [McKe-
own et al., 1991 ], particularly when accounting for the size of tbe client relative 
to the size of the local office [Reynolds and Francis, 2001]. One ex:planation 
for the differcnce in tindings may líe in the control variables that are used in 
these studies. Ireland [2003] included audit and non-audit fees, audit firm size, 
and plior GCO as control variables, while McKeown et al. [1991] did not in-
elude these control variables. Forther, Carey and Simnett [2006] controlled for 
several financial distress variables and also found that client size is not a sig-
ni;ficant variable in predicting propensity to issue a GCO for Austrajjan finan-
ciillly-distressed companies. Ne vertheless, given tbe difference between U.K 
and U.S. findings, future research could consider whether differences in the 
regulatory environment or risk Ievels to the auditor help explain the contradic-
tory findings. 
We identified one study that examined the association between auditors' 
propensily to issue GCOs and distressed clients' audit committee composition. 
Carcello and Neal [2000] found that auditors were less likely to issue GCOs as 
ttí~ proportion of affiliated directors increased~ they defined affiliated as client 
eniployees, related party employees, fonner employees, and other individuals 
with a relationship with lhe client. Future research could investigate other is-
sues relating to GCOs and client corporate governance. For instance, does the 
pFesence of a financiai expert, as required by SOX [U.S.H.R., 2002], influence 
auditors' propensity to issue GCOs? Other corporate governance factors that 
C9.Liid influence GCO formation are frequency of' audlt committee meetings, the 
number of boards on which each audit committee member serves, and length of 
service of audit committee members. 
3.1.1 Client Earnings Management 
Earnings management refers to purposeful manipulation of externa! finan-
cia! reporting, often through accruals [Schipper, 1989]. If clíent management 
encounters a going concem situation, the possibility exists that they could man-
age earnings to avoid the appearance of a going concern issue. Researchers 
have considcred this possibility, and have investigated the relationship between 
client attempts to manage earnings and the likelihood the auditor will issue a 
GCO. This literature focuses on whether earnings management ·attempts influ-
ence auditors' propensíty to issue GCOs. Evidence on this issue is mixed. 
Frands and Krishnan [ 1999] reported that the magnitud e of accruals is 
positively associated with auditors' propensity to issue GCOs. However, Butler 
et al. f) 004] re-examined this association, and found that companies receiving 
GCOs· had large negative accruals that were more likely to be due to severe 
finanéial distress rather than earnings management. Evidence from other jurís-
dictions also provides conflicting results. Herbohn and Ragunathan [2008] 
found that Australian companies with GCOs have abnormal accruals of greater 
magnitude than companies with other types of qualifications. In contrast, 
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Arncdo et al. [2008] rep01tecl that auditors were more likely to issue GCOs to 
Spanish bankruptcy companies wben discretionary accruals were lower. 
At this poinl, only a handful of stuclies ha ve investigated the association be-
tween earnings management and GCOs, and these studies seem to provide in-
consislent results. Perhaps experimental research can help in this area by ma-
nipulating the reason for the abnormal accruals (to manage earnings or true 
financia! distress). Additionally, since Butler et al. [2004] and Francis and 
Krishnan [ 1999] used pre-SO X data, future research could investigare whether 
changes in conservatism following SOX impact the relationship between the 
magnitude of accruals and auditors ' propensity to issue GCOs. Finally, the 
relationsh.ip between GCOs and additional earnings management matters could 
be investigated (e.g., real earnings management, meeting earnings expectations, 
using special income statement items). 
3.1.2 Client Press Coverage 
Earnings releases are only one source of public exposure that a company 
expcriences; companies will often receive press coverage from media outlets 
such as the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). This publicity, particularly negative 
publicity, has the potential to influence auditors' going concern assessmen ts. 
Using arch.ival and behavioral methodologies respectively, Mutchler et al. 
l1997] and Joe [2003] provided evidence that auditors were more likely to is-
sue GCOs foUowing negative client press coverage about debt covenant viola-
tions in the WSJ than when clients do not receive such press coverage. How-
ever, WSJ coverage does not impact the likelihood of bankruptcy [Mutchler et 
al., 1997]. 
Joe [2003] concluded that the effect of clien t press coverage on auditors' 
propensity to issue GCOs represents a reaction to known information because 
her panicipants did not believe the press coverage increased Htigation ris.k. 
Mutchler et al. [1997] reached a similar conclusion: WSJ coverage could influ-
ence aud.ítors simply because it is a disdosure via press releasc. However, Joe 
[2003] noted that disclosures tluough different media outlets .might have a dif-
ferent int1uence on auditor judgmeot and that press coverage providing positive 
infonnntion could also influence the· auditor. Accordingly, following Joe 
[2003] , future researcb could exruninc the effects .of negative publicity from 
other media such as television and Internet on auditor· GCO judgments and 
dccisions, and whether positive media reports about distressed clients would 
decrease the likelihood of GCOs, perhaps increasing the risk of Type U errors. 
3.2 GCQs and Forecasting Bankruptcies 
3.2.1 Forecasting Models 
.. At the time of Asare·s review, a re1ative1y mature body of research ·had ex-
arnined issues relating to forecasting ·client bankruptcy using pubHcly-available 
data .such as financia! scatement ratios. The studies included in Asare's review 
indicated: that .bank.ruptcy prediction models can improve auditors' ability to 
identify:fi nancially distressed companies. Research has cont1nued to investigate 
this· issue, and has provided further evidence that forecasting models can im-
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prove auditors' going concern judgments and decisions [Bcll ancl Tabor, 1991; 
Koh, 1991 ].3 
Behn at al. [2001] extended Chen ancl Church [1992] by invesligating the 
ability to predict going concern reports using publicly available infonnation. 
Behn et al. [2001] examined management' s voluntarily disclosed plans to alle-
viate tlnancial distress (i.e., increase ownership equity, borrow money or re-
structure debt, and reduce spending or dispose of assets). They found that audi-
tors' going concern reporting decisions are associated with cerlain management 
plans as specified by SAS No. 59. Specitkally, auditors were less likely to is-
sue going concern reports when management disclosed plans to issue equity 
and to borrow additional funds (while controlling for financia! heallh, loan de-
fault status, etc.). Further, Riley et al. [2000) found that management's plans 
(e,.g., dispose of assets, issue new eguüy, etc.) can provide going concern reso-
lution information to the market as to whether a company will likely resolve 
th~ going concem problem. 
Other studies have extended this literature by comparing the merits of vari-
ous models to forecasl client distrcss. Cormier et al. [ 1995] u sed a modcl com-
prised of several quantitative and qualitative va1iables to predict going concern 
opinions. They found that logit, discriminant, and recursive partitioning models 
are all able to discriminare failing from non-failing finns. Lenard et aL [1995] 
investigated the abiJity of one logit model and two neural network models to 
determine wbether auditors shou1d issue GCOs, and found that the neural net-
w¿rk model using a generalized reduced gradienc {GRG2) optimizer has the 
highest prediction accuracy (95 percent). 
Lenard et al. [2000] compared the relative accuracy of two types of GCO 
m?dels: a fuzzy clustering model and a hybrid model. The fuzzy clustering 
model uses fuzzy logic to group data using subjective reasoning rather than 
precise values. The hybrid model incorporates both quantitative (i.e., using 
státistical modeling) and qualitative (i.e., using an expert system) information. 
Lenard et al. [2000] reported two advantages of the hybrid model. First, while 
both models are highly accurate, the hybrid model is more accurate than the 
fuzzy clustering model. Second, the professional appeal of the fuzzy clustering 
model likely has Iimitations because it cannot analyze distress on a company~ 
by-company basis. 
In addition to using forecasting models, auditors also can rely on their own 
intimate k.nowledge of the client, client industry, client management character-
istics, the reliability of management for~casts for the next period, and ·actual 
events when forecasting client distress and deciding whether to issue GCO 
[Biggs et al., 1993]. Tbus, in addition to lhe client'·s financia! condition, ad:. 
verse conditions such as downtums in the client industry or overly optimistic 
management forecasts can influence going concern judgments. However, Ar-
nold et al. [200 1] suggested that auditors ought to exercise caution when con:.' 
sidering sucb non-financia! information because specialists with greater experi~ 
ence rpjght be better able to identify distressed clients. 'Further, Arnold et aL 
[2001] asserted that auditor judgrnents concerning client distress are compara2 
. ' 
3 For :r. recent revicw of bankruplt."Y prediction rnodels and going concem prediction models, pleas¿ 
refer lo Campbcll el al. [2008]. · 
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ble to those of inexperienced solvcncy spccialists, a comment that furthers 
Chen and Cbmch's [1992] findings. While auditors appear to rely on loan de-
faults (i.e., noncompliance with lending agreements or missing scheduled pay-
ments) when decidíng what type of opinion to issue, default s tatus is nota good 
indicator of impending firm faiJure [Chen and Church, 1992]. 
Other research focuses on whether GCOs are effective predictors of bank-
ruptcy. At the time of Asare's review, research indicated that auditors' GCOs 
are often less accurate than models in predicting bankruptcy. Severa! studies 
provide similar evidence. Foster et al. [1998] found that GCOs actually are not 
a significant predictor of bankruptcies if the forecasting model also includes 
loan defaults and debt covenant violations, and concluded that future resea.rch 
should use these variables as controls when examining GCO effectiveness in 
bankruptcy forecasting. Fu.rther, Lennox [ 1999] tound that bankruptcy predic-
tion models can be more accurate than audit opinions, and that audit opinions 
do not signal useful incremental information about tbe probability of bank-
ruptcy when controlling for public information about the economic cycle, com-
pany s ize, and industry sector. Finally, Casterella et al. [2000] noted that sorne 
companies that declare bankruptcy successfully reorganize, but they also found 
that auditors were unable to successfully predict bankruptcy filings or resolu-
tions. One study provides evidence suggesting that auditors' GCOs and fore-
casting models predict bankruptCies with the samc level of accmacy [Hopwood 
et al., 1994]. ln addition, first-time GCOs are associated with a higher likeH-
hood of bankruptcy tban non-GCO companies [Geiger et al., 1998]. 
The resea.rch on forecasting GCOs leads us to coriclude that auditors, per-
haps with the assistance of solvency specialists or models, issue GCOs with a 
relatively high degree of accuracy using financial statement ratios, other pub-
Iicly-available data, and knowledge tbe audüor possesses about the client. 
However, many unanswered questions remain. For instance, while the Lenard 
et al. [2000] hybrid model and the Lenard e t al. [1995) nenral network are ac-
curate predictors of GCOs, are they practica! decision aids? Lenard et aL 
[1995] do note that their model should be tested by auditors. Do auditors pos-
sess sufficieot tecbtúcal expertise to use these models? lf not; what degree of 
training is required, and would lhe model pass cost-benefit considerations? To 
what extent do audit íirms actually rely on bankruptcy prediction models in 
practice, and would a GCO flag triggered by a bankruptcy prediction model be 
sufficient evidence for an audilor to issue a GCO? If audieors are not willing to 
use sucb models, what factors drive those decisions? 
3.2.2 The Self-FulfiUing Prophccy 
Sorne problems arise when evaluating the ability of GCOs to predict client 
bank.ruptcy. First, the GCO is not designed to be a prediction of bankruptcy, 
but ratber to express the auditor's concern about the client's ability to continue 
in existence [AICPA, 1988b]. Second, -research is conflicting as to wbelher 
GCOs result in a self-fulfiJling prophecy (i.e., the GCO opinion incre.ases the 
ükelihood the client will fail). Sorne studies have provided evidence tbat sup-
ports such a self-fulfilling prophecy [e.g., Tucker et al., 2003; Vanstraelen 
2003]. Specifically, research suggests that first-tirne GCOs are associated with 
a higher likelihood of bankruptcy compared to non-GCO companies [Geiger et 
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al., 1998], and that firs t-time GCOs are more likely to resul t in bankruptcy in 
the first year following the GCO than in later years rLomvers et al. , 1999). 
However, both Citron and Taffler [2001) and Carey ct al. [2008] found that 
companies with GCOs are no more likcly to fail than those without such dis-
closures, and Cítron and Taffler [ 1992] found that only 24 percent of GCO-
clients subsequently fail. Similarly, Nogler [2004] found that auditors are cor-
rect to remove GCO in the majority (71 percent) of cases, indicating that most 
clients who successfully resolve GCOs do not appear subject to self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Additionally, Citron and Taffler [200 l l found that it is the degree of 
financial distress that drives both bankruptcy and the auditor's going concem 
disclosure. Given these conflicting results, l'uture researchers could attempt to 
resolve the discrepancy arnong these studies, and determine whether the self-
t;ulfilling prophecy exists. 
3.3. Auditor Characteristics 
3.3.1 Auditor Economic Incentives 
3.3.1.1 Audit Fees, Non-Audit Fees, and Auditor Independence 
Several studies have exanüned auditor economic incentives by determ.ining 
wliether audit anci/or non-audit fees in1luence GCO formation. These issues 
have critical implications for auditor independence and the regulatory envi-
ronment because the U.S. government has legislated restrictions for non-audit 
services [SOX - U.S.H.R., 2002]. Accordingly, regulators should períodically 
reevaluate sucb restrictions, and academic research should help inform such 
assessments. 
1 
--Before reviewing research on the relationship between audit fees and audi-
tors' propensity to issue GCOs, we first consider a.study that examines the rela-
tionship between the disclosure of audit fees incr~ses auditors ' propensity ro 
issue GCOs. Lai [2009] exarnined GCOs both befare and after the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) required disclosures of audit fees in 2000 as 
a way of protecting auditor independence [Lai, .2009]. Lai [2009] found that 
audüors are more likely to issue GCO~i when they must disdose fees than when 
fee disclosure is not mandated, and concluded:that,Jee disdosure is ,associated 
with improved auditor independence. Other research provides a different way 
of considering auditor independence. Tlús liteiature· investigares the relation- · · 
ship between fees and GCOs, research using~'tLS::data provides 'nuxed resnlts. . : '· 
Callaghan et al. [2009] and Defond et al. [20021 ~fouud that non-audit fees, au-
dit fees, total fees, and ratíos of non-audit fees to' total fees do not- influence , \\ .. 
auditors' propensity to issue GCOs. However, ' 6ther research suggests thal . . . . 
-:., ..... -.." 
higher audit fees -are positively associated with GCOs. [Geiger and Rama; , · :· 
2003]. .and that non-Big N auditors are more like1y to issue GCOs:to clients· --.<~. • 
with higher ratios of non-audit fees to total fees [Hunt and Lulseged, 2007]. ;}f.;~; 
More recent srud
8
ies ha ve attedmp thed hto reconcil~ the. di~fer~nces idn .findinghs . -~~·.·:~_:;.·-.:.~; ~~ 
Lim and Tan [200 ] investigare w et .er auditor spectabzatmn mo erates t e .. 
rel ationship between non-audit fees and auditors' likelihood to issue GCOs. · ::~~1\,{ ~-. 
~ ... , ... , .. : "": .. 
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They found that industry specialists are more lik.ely to issue GCOs when non-
audit fees are higher but non-audit fees do not impact non-specialísts' likeli-
hood to issue GCOs. Li [2009] examined the association between audit fees 
and GCOs al the firm office level. She found that auditors are more likely to 
issue GCOs to clients with a relatively greater proportion of audít fees at the 
office leve!, suggesting that auditors' independence might not be impaired in 
the post-SOX environment. Concerning tax fees specifically, Robinson [2008] 
found a positive associnlion between the level of tax sen•ice fees and the Iikeli-
hood of auditors correctly issuing GCOs. Robinson [2008] contended, there-
fore, that restricting tax services could diminish audit quality when tbe audit 
firm also provides tax services. Perhaps the knowledge of the client gained 
through providing tax services irnproves auditors' GCO decisions. Coilecti vely, 
evidence from the U.S. is rnixed concerning the relationship between non-audit 
fees, audit fees, and their influence on auditan; ' propensity to ÍS$Ue GCOs. 
Research from other jurisd1ctions provides more cons1steot results suggest-
ing that non-audit fees reduce the likelihood auditors will issue GCOs. Sharma 
and Sidhu [200 l] used a sample of bankrupt Australían companies and found 
that companíes with hígh ratios of non-audit to total fees were less líkely to 
receive GCOs. Similar! y, using U .K. data, Basioudis et al. [2008] found that 
companies with higher levels of non-audit fees were less likely to receive 
GCOs. Sorne potential explanations for the contlictíng results from studíes in 
the U.S. and other jurisdictions include possible differences in litigation and 
regulatmy environments in dífferent countries and sample time period used. 
For ínstance, Sharma and Sidhu's [2001] Australi~ sample covers 1989 
through 1996, while CaUaghan et al.'s [2009] U.S. sample covers 2001 through 
early 2005. Therefore, it is unclear whether SOX, other regulatory changes 
o ver time such as Jitigation reform in the U.S. (see .our section 2.0), or other 
factors contribute to differences across studies that vary both by jurisdiction 
and by ti me perlod. 
The relationship between fees and independence continues to be important 
given the SOX-imposed ban on many non-audít services [U.S.H.R., 2002]. 
Accordingly, we believe severa! fruitful oppo1tunities for future research re-
main. For instance, all research to-date investigating GCOs and non-audit ser-
vices has included prc-SOX data. Future researcb should examine purely post-
SOX periods to deternúne if early results concerning GCOs and non-audit ser-
vices still hold in the post-SOX period. Additionally, following Lai [2009], 
future research could consider whether allowing expanded non-audit services, 
but requiring auditors to disclose all fees, would improve independence. Fi-
nally, .fi.1ture research could investigate other potential sources of increased 
independence in the formation of GCOs. For example, does requiring an en-
gagement quality reviewer to provide an opinion regarding a client' s going 
concern status, separate from the engagement team's going concern evaluation, 
i.ncrease independence? · 
2010 Gissd, Robenson, Stefwriak 105 
3.3.1.2 Trade-offs Between P•·ofitability and Litigation Incentives 
In this subsection, we shift from a focus on audit fees to economic incen-
tives for both profitability and avoiding litigation. Profitability incentives relate 
to audit fees, but we view the literature we review in this section as different in 
scope because the focus is on issues such as the potential to lose clients based 
on audit judgments and decisions, whereas the focus in 3.3.1 .1 was specifically 
on audit fees. Our focus in this subsection is the body of research conceming 
the trade-off between two economic incenti ves that can conflict with one an-
other: profitability incenrives and litigation risk incentives. On one hand, the 
auditor is a rational actor with economic incentives to attract and retain profit-
able clients [Gendron, 2002; DeAngelo, 1981]. Conversely, the auditor h~u; 
incentives to conduct audits in accordance with professional standards to 
~pimize litigation risk [Reynolds and Francis, 2001].4 This conflict is promi-
ne?t during opin:ion formation because auditors can lose clients and future prof-
its when they issue GCOs [e.g., Carey et al. , 2008; Ettredge et al. , 2007; Van-
straelen, 2003] . However, auditors potentially face costly li tigation if they fail 
to modify the opinion when the client' s financial statements or financia] condi-
tion merits a departure from the clean opinion [Carcello and Palmrose, 1994 ]. 
LaSalle and Anandarajan [1996] found that the majority of audit partners indi-
cate l.itigation risk is important in the GCO decision, and about half of the sur-
veyed partners view Htigation risk as highly important oras sufficient alone to 
justify a GCO. · 
- Several studies show that auditors respond more to litigation risk than lo 
profitability incentives. In an experimental economics study, Tucker et al. 
[20031 found that audit opinions reflect a desire to adhere to professional re-
sponsibility, which typically decreases litigation risk. They found that when 
ay_I:Iítors' initíal judgments indicate that the c!ient will fail to continue as a go-
ing concem , auditors gencrally issued GCOs, even though such an action Jikely 
meantlosing the client. Reynolds and Francis [2001] investigated the economic 
incentives of tbe audit firm's local office by measuiing the size of the client 
relative to the size of the local office.5 They fou nd no evidence that profitability 
incentives influence auditors' GCO decisions. Indeed, Reynolds and Francis 
[200 1] found that auditors were more likely to issue GCOs for relatively large 
clicnts, which the authors interpreted as evidence of a positive association be-
tween the propensity to issue GCOs and litigatíon risk because larger clients 
carry greater li tigation risk. An experiment conducted by Blay [2005] provides 
support for this intcrpretation, as he found that auditors were more likely to 
issue a GCO when li tigation risk is high than when litigation risk is low. 
Changes in litigation risks following regulatory developments also can mo-
tívate GCOs. The PSLRA {1995) and the Securities Litigation Uniform Stan-
dards Act (1998), which jointly reduce aud.itors ' legal liability for public com-
pany audits [e.g., Geiger and Raghunandan, 2001], decreased auditors ' propen-
sity to · issue GCOs [Geiger et al., 2006; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2001, 
4 In addiúon lo the economic incentive lo avoid litigation , auditor.; havc incentive to avoid lhe loss of 
reputatioo that accompanies litigation [Reynolds and Francis, 20011. 
s Scc Reynolds and Francis [200 l] for a discussion of li tigation concems lhal accompany la rgc c lients. 
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2002a]. This effect was especially pronounced for .Big N firms (Geiger et al., 
2006], wh.ich carry sizable legallíability involving large public clients.~ . 
Other studies investigated the role of Jitigation risk in thc manner m whtch 
auditors convey GCOs (i.e., modified unqualified or_ disclaimer), pr~vi~i~g 
evidence that auditors who beJieve GCOs will protect fmns from legal babJ.hty 
tended to disclaim when Htigation risk was high because the client was large, 
public , and/or the extremity of the financia! discress was high [Anandarajan et 
al. , 2001 ; LaSalle et al. , 1996]. 
Results from less litigious jurisdictions provide corroborative evidence that 
Jiti oation risk affects GCOs. Lam and Mensah [2006] fou nd that e ven in the 
o 
low-litigation Iisk environment of Hong Kong, auditors were more l ikely to 
issue disclaimers when client distress was severe. However,. Lam and Mensah 
[2006] found no relationship between client size and the use of a modified un-
qualified or dísclaimer to disclose the GCO, futther strengthening the case that 
U.S. auditors' methods of conveying GCOs could be partly attributable to liti-
gation risks. In a discussion of Lam and Mensah [2006], LaSalle (2006] sug-
gested that when litigation risk is low, auditors may issue disclaimers to con ve y 
GCOs because the prot1table auditor-client relationship is unlikely to conrinue, 
and the aud.itor essentially has little to lose by disclaiming an opinion. This 
analysis suggesls that profitability incentives could be at work as well. Indeed, 
several studies indicare that profitability incentives influence lhe issuance of 
GCOs under certain circumstances. Carcello et al. [2000] found tbat partners 
with compensation plans more heavily linked to local offíce performance are 
more sensitive to client size when deciding whether to issue GCOs. They found 
that such partners are less likely to issue GCOs to large clients than are partners 
wíth compensation plans more heavily linked to .overall firm peli"onnance. 
Concerning the relationship between client distress and GCOs, Blay [2005] 
found that when a distressed client threatcns to switch audit firms, auditors 
were Jess likely to issue GCOs than if the client" does not threaten to switch 
audit tirms, inclicating a desire to retain tbe client and the associated audit fees. 
Concerning the Australian market, Carey and Simnett [2006] found that 
auditors were less I.ikely to issue GCOs as auditor tenure "increases, and inter-
preted this result as an indication of an inverse reJationship between audit qual-
íty and auditor tenure. A related but different interpretation of Carey and Sim-
nett [2006] is that auditors are sensitive to profitability incentives when decid-
ing whether to issue GCOs. This interpretation tol1ows DeAngelo [1981] , who 
argued that auditors "low-ball" [p. 113] on the initial engagement because of 
~11arket forces, and gradually raise audit fees over time to recover the lost prof-
Jts from the early engagement[s]. Therefore, auditoni could hesitate to issue 
GCOs ~s. tenure i_ncreases beca use. they ha ve reached a position in which they 
areTeahzmg proflts, and do not wtsh lo lose the client in favor of a new client 
with 1ower audit fees. This assertion is consistent with our revíew of resea.rch 
concerning consequences of GCOs to auditors (4.2), which suggests that GCOs 
can prompt _the client to switch audi'tors (and place the auditor in a position to 
lose the audlt revenue from that client). 
. 
6
• Picase scc our section (2.2.2) on the e ffccts of laws and regu lmions on GCO fonnation for more 
dtscusston ol these und other t-egulatory devclopmems. 
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Evidence from Belgium, another low-litigalion risk environment [Van-
straelen, 2002], suggests that unlike in Hong Kong [Lam and Mensah, 2006], 
the frequency of GCOs reflects auditors' profitability incentives. Vanstraelen 
[2002] found an inverse relationship between audit fees and auditors' propeu-
sity to issue GCOs. Additionally, Vanstraelen [2002] found that auditors who 
ha ve lost market share in the previous year were less likely to issue GCOs. 
There is also evidence that auditors operate outside the infl uence of eco-
nonüc incentives when making GCO decisions. Louwers [1998] found that, 
when evaluating the client as a going concern, auditors emphasized client fi-
nancial condition rather than profitability or litigation concerns. In conclusion, 
prior research on the conflicting economic incentives of profitability ancl Jitiga-
tion suggests that either or both of these incentives can influence auditor judg-
.~m,ents under certain circumstances, and that changes in the regulatory environ-
ment influence GCO frequency [Geiger et al., 2005; Geiger and Raghunandan, 
2001, 2002]. Future research should investigate whether the regulatory changes 
of the first decade of the 2l sL century have irnpacted the trade-off between prof-
itabi1ity incentives and litigation risks, as the majority of U.S. research reHes on 
data that predates SOX. Further, how have the recent financia! ctisis and ensu-
ing government bailouts influenced GCO formation? For instance, if the audi-
tor is aware a company will receive federal assistance (e.g., TARP funds), does 
the auditor consider that information when determining whether a GCO is ap-
pr;opriate? 
¡ Future research also should rep1icate Blay [2005] in arder to advance our 
understanding of the conflict between the economic incentives of protitability 
and rninimizing litigation exposure. Blay [2005] found that both profitability 
i.I}.centives and litigation risk influence auditor GCO judgments, but did not find 
e';'idence of an interaction. However, Blay [2005] concluded that his profitabil-
ity manipulation may have been weaker than the iitigation risk manipulation. 
Future researchers could increase the salience of the profitability incentive by 
explicitly mentioning the amount of revenue the accounting firm would lose if 
the client switched audit firms, perhaps as a percentage of total fmn revenues. 
A related issue is the effect of a different way of reporting GCOs on litigation~ 
For instance, if auditors provided a probability of GCO rather t11an an opinion 
expressing doubt about the client's ability to continue to operate, would li tiga-
tion risk increase, decrease, or not change? 
3.3.1.3 Audit Firm Size 
It is reasonable to expect that audit firm size will be positively related to 
the propensity to issue GCOs, given that prior research suggests tbat large 
firrns provide higher quality audits (for a review, see Francís [2004]). Severa! 
studies provide evidence consistent with this expectation. Weber and WHlen- ;~~ 
borg [2003] found that Big N audit frrms are more likely to issue pre-IPO 
GCOs: than other audit firms. Sirnilarly, using data from the U.K., Ireland 
[2003] also found that large audit frrms are more Iikely to issue GCOs than 
.. ). 
small audit fums. Geiger and Rama [2006) found tbat non-Big N firms have ::. 
higher Type I and Type 11 error rates involving GCOs than Big N firms, consi~; :~C 
tent with higher quality frorn large finns. However, for companies that eventu~ ~ ·:~"-... 
;·~~- ·. 
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ally tile bankruptcy, it appears that non-Big N tirms are more likely to issue 
GCOs tban Big N tirms (Wertheiro and Fowler, 2005]. 
3.3.2 Auditor Cognitive Processes and GCOs 
As with forecasting client bankruptcy, a relatively rnature body of reseru·ch 
had investigated auditor cognitive processes preceding GCOs at the tim~ of 
Asare's revíew. These studies included in Asare's review focused on a vanety 
of topícs such as hypothesis framing, order effects and belief revis~o~, and the 
recall of relevant information. Over the last two decades, the maJonty of re-
search on auditor cognition and GCOs has focused on order effects _and belief 
revision, i.e., whether the order in which auditors receive evidence mfluences 
going concern judgments [e.g., Favere-Marchesi, 2006; Asare, 1992]. This 
research suggests a recen e y effect bias in auditors' GCO judgments [Favere-
Marchesi , 2006; Guiral and Esteo, 2006; Ashton and Kennedy, 2002; Asare, 
1992]. 
Some studies shed additional light on this apparently robust phenomenon. 
For instance, Ricchiute [1992] found that not only does the sequential order 
matter, but that partners are more (less) lik.ely to conclude a GCO was appro-
priate when strongesl evidence for a GCO was received in causal (working-
paper) arder. Bonner (1994] took a different approach to examirung the rela-
rionship between auditor cognitive processes and GCO formation . She ana-
lyzed severa] published articles that experimentally investigare GCO formation, 
and rated each on the complexity of the experimental task. Bonner [1994] con-
cluded that differences in task complexity across GCO experiments likely ac-
count for some of the differences in results arnong these studies, and proposed 
that future research consider manipulating or controlling for task complexüy in 
GCO formation experiments. Research from other jurisdictlons also has exarn-
ined order effects in GCO formation, as Guiral and· Esteo [2006] found that 
Spanish auditors also exhibit a recency effect during GCO formation . 
The literature also provides evidence that recency effects are robust ro sev-
eral potential moderators, including hypothesis framing as either viable or fail-
ing [Guhal and Esteo, 2006; Asare, 1992] and auditor experience [Guiral and 
Esteo, 2006]. While the recency effect in going concern judgments appears. to 
representa common, robust occutl'ence, decision aids can mitigate this poten-
tial detriment to audit quality. Ashton and Kennedy [2002] found that a simple 
decision aid can eliminate recency effects in going concern judgments: staff 
auditors who made a final probability revision following a prompt to consider 
alJ evidence were not susceptible to recency effects in GCO judgments. In ad-
dition, the results of Favere-Marchesi [2006] suggest that another simple deci-
sion aid is to prompt auditors to consider both the presentation order and the 
chronological order of evidence, as he found that auditors who consider 
chrónological order were less susceptible to recency effects. 
?ne study suggests that profession~ demands to balance multiple clients 
can mfluence auditors ' cognitive processes on specific clients. Rau and Moser 
[1999] found that when auditors are provided with an identicaJ set of informa-
tion, seniors who performed anothér audit task for whlch the underJying facts 
of the case reflected positively {negatively) on the company's viábility, subse-
2010 Gissel, Robenson. Srefaniak 109 
guently made going concem judgments were rclatively more posilive (nega-
tive). 
A final area of cognitive research concerns the weighting of audit evidence. 
LaSalle and Anandarajan [1996] foond that auditors place more emphasis on 
negative than positive client attributes during GCO formation. Perhaps auditors 
tend to be risk-averse when deciding whether to issue a GCO because of poten-
tiallitigation concems involved with issuing a clean opinion for companies that 
fail. Sorne specific negative atttibutes auditors associate with client distress 
include lack of long-term planning, scapegoating, management turnover, low 
morale, loss of budgetary slack, and non-prioritized cuts [Ponemon and Schick, 
1991]. 
In summa.ry , our review of the literature involving cognitive processes in 
gping concem judgments generates the following conclusions and potential 
dir~ctions for futw·e research. First, while auditors cu·e susceptible to recency 
eff~crs when forming going concem judgments [e.g., Favere-Marchesi, 2006; 
Asare, 1992], simple decision aids such as a prompt ro consid'er all evídence 
coUectively after reviewing the evidence [Ashton and Kennedy, 2002] or con-
sidering the chronological arder of eviderice [Favere-Marchesi, 2006] can miti-
gare recency effects. Although investigating the role of arder effects on auditor 
judgrnent is a relatively rnature field of study, opportunities for future research 
remain. For instance, thc participants in the Ashton and Kennedy [2002] study 
w~re staff auditors. Jf partners and managers, who are more likely to evaluatc 
cliclnts as going concenis, consider all evidence collectively befare making a 
judgment, would recency effects remain? Further, does the timing of the deci-
sion aid influence its effectiveness concerning GCO judgments? Would similar 
res_plts occur if the auditor receives the prompt befare evaluating any evidence? 
. Second, an auditor's initial hypothesis concerning client viability or failme 
does not appear to mitigate recency effects [Asare, 1992]. Third, auditors at-
ténd more to negative information about the dient than to positive information 
in going concem settings [LaSalle and Anandarajan, 1996]. However, as Guiral 
and Esteo [2006] observed, profitabili.ty incentives and litigation risk can int1u-
ence evidence weighting (c.f. , our section 3.3.1.2). Do audilors in some situa-
tions, perhaps in response to economic incentives, attend more to positive in-
fOtmation items to avoid alienating the' client? Finally, is it possible that arder 
effects interact on sorne leve! with olher engagement risk factors (e.g., litiga-
tion risk, reputation risk, etc.) to influence auditor GCO formation? 
3.3.3 Auditor Expertise 
It is reasonable to expect that as an auditor's expertise in an industry 
grows, so does their ability to interpret the financia! health of a business em-
bedded in that industry. Accordingly, in this section we review Hterature that 
has investigated whether auditor expertise is associated with GCO formation, 
issuance, and accuracy. Conceming auditors' expertise, Chao [1996] found that 
more e·xperienced auditors were able to make better going concern judgments, 
in part, by being able to identify atypical audit events as well as by having a 
Jarger extent of knowledge abstractness. Further, Reichelt and Wang [2010] 
found that auditors with greater industry expertise were more Hkely to issue 
GCOs. However, auditor tenure, which is one manner to gain industry exper-
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tise, is not associated with audítors ' propensity to issue GCOs to stressed Bel-
gian companies [Knechel and Vanstraelen, 2007], but is negatively associated 
with auditors' propensity to issue GCOs [Carey and Sinmett, 2006;. Geiger and 
Raghunandan, 2002b]. SOX requires audit partner rotation every five years, 
which provides an opportunity for future research to examine whether partner-
specific tenure influences GCO issuance. In addition, future research could 
examine the GCO formatíon in a group setting (similar to recent researcb on 
fraud risk brainstorming), or how engagement partners and additional technical 
advi sors help form the GCO opinion. 
4.0 CONSEQUENCES OF GCOS 
In this seclion, we review literature conceming the consequences of audit 
opínions for client stockholders and creditors, as well as for audit fmns. Spe-
cifically, we sununarize a group of studies conceming the use, perceptions, and 
impacts of GCOs. At the time of Asare' s review, the literature generally fo-
cused on the impact of GCOs on client equity reactions and yielded núxed re-
sults concerning whether GCOs actualJy are infmmative to the market. The key 
issues in this section are the consequences of GCOs for audit clients ( 4.1 ), cli-
enl stakeholders (4.2) and the audit flrm (4.3). While it seems intuitive that 
GCOs would yield negative market reactions, research on this issue does not 
always support that outcome. Additionally, it also seems intuitive that a client 
will be more likely to dismiss an auditor following a GCO. Howúer, tl).e litera-
ture we review indicares that the relationship between GCOs and auditor 
switching is more complex tban it núght appear at first glance. Table 3 sumrna-
rizes the studies that investigate issues pertaining to the consequences of 
GCOs. 
TABLE 3: Consequences of GCOs (Section 4.0) 
Panel A: Consequences ofGCOs to the Client (4.1) 
Study Sample Dependent lndependent Key (Method) Variable[ S] Variable[s] Findúzg[s] 
Nogler 377 u.s. Resolution of NIA About one-
[1995) public GCO . third each of 
(Archiva!) companies those with 
that received complete data 
GCOs from went through 
1983-1991 bankruptcy, 
changed fonn 
.. through 
dissolution or 
. . merger, or 
subsequently 
received.clean 
opinions 
. ;"" 
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--
Krislman 1,077 public Audit report Ye<1r; Whether The new 
and Yang companies lag; Earnings company disclosure 
[2009] with nnnouncemenl receives GCO requiremenl 
(Archiva!) observations lag incrcased audit 
from 2001· report Jags 
2006 both 
immediately 
before and 
afler it \:vent 
into effecl; 
GCOs are 
positively 
' associated 
J with audit 
reporl lags and 
earnings 
. 
announccmcnt 
lags 
Panel B: Clients Stakeholder Reactions to GCOs (Section 4.2) 
! ¡ Study Sample Dependent Independent Key (Method) Variablefs] Variable[s] Finding[s] 
-~ Fields and 52 withdrawn Abnonnal NIA Firms 
Wilkins [ 1991] opinions returns experienced 
·· (Archiva!) announced a positivc 
between 1978 abnormal 
. ~ - and 1987 return on thc 
day GCOs 
were 
withdrawn 
Fleak. and 495 firms wíth Abnormal Whether the Fim1s that 
Wilson [1994] going concem relurns company received an 
(ArchivaJ) qualifications recei\'ed a unexpected-
frorn 1979 to GCO; GCO 
1986 Whether experience 
GCOis abnorma! 
unexpected security retums 
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Kwon and Wild 100 u.s. Abnormal Whether the First-time 
[1 994] public returns company GCOsare 
(Archiva!) companies received a informalive: 
that received a first-time companies 
first-time GCO receiving first-
GCOfrom timeGCOs 
1989- ¡ 99 l. experience 
and a control abnormal 
sample of 96 reactions 
non-GCO during each of 
coropanies the two years 
preced.i ng the 
GCO 
Chen and 56 (42) firms Firm's Whether the GCOs are 
Church [1996) filing for retum for company m;eful in 
(Archiva!) bankruptcy accumulation received a explaining 
lhat received period Iess GCO excess returns 
unqualified return of occurring 
{going same size around 
concern) decile bankruptcy 
opinions portfolio for fil ings; GC 
accumulation firms 
perlad experience less 
negative excess 
returns than 
other firms in 
three-, fi ve-, 
and seven-day 
windows 
surrounding 
bankruptcy 
· filings 
Jones 68 audit Abnormal Whetherthe Mean abnormal 
[ 1996) reports of returns campan y returns 
(Archiva!) going concern received a surrounding the 
uncertainties GCO; the release of the 
and 86 market' s auditor' s report 
unqunlified assessment of was negative 
audit reports probability for fi rms which 
from firm will · received GCOs 
financially receive a and positive for 
distressed GCO distressed firms 
firms whicb received 
clean opinions 
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Subramanyam 25,160 ll.S. Earnings Whether the Going concern 
and Wild [ J 996] public cocfficient company status is 
(Archiva() company reccivcd a infom1ative: 
firm-quarter · GCO the likelihood 
observations of recei ving 
from 198 1- GCOs is 
1990 inversely 
related to 
earnings 
persi:.tencc 
Wilkins [1997] 159 firms Whether the Crcditors' Creditors are 
(Archiva!) traded on the auditor issues decisions of less likely to 
NYSE/AMEX aGCO whether to waivc init ial 
or NASDAQ, wnive initial debt covenant 
5 and having debt covenant violations if rhe 
initial default violations auditor issues a 
dates ranging GCO 
from 1978 to 
1988 
Carlson et al. 88 GCOs Daily Wbether thc Significam 
[1998} issued lo U.S. security company negative 
(Archiva!) public return received a market return ¡ 
' companies GCO for going 
from 1981 to concern 
1988, and a companies 
-· 
matchcd relat.ive to 
sample of stressetl 
stressed non- companies tJwt 
GCO did not receive 
companies GCOs 
Morris and 232 Closed status Whether tbe Bank 
Stawser [1999] companies of bank company regulators are 
(Archiva]) ( 116 closed reccived a more likely to 
and 116 GCO allow a bank to 
non-closed) continue 
Texas banks operating if che 
between 1990- bank received a 
1991 modified 
opinion 
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Holder-Webb 217 fi rms that Stock returns Whether SAS Bankruptcy 
and Wilkins fi led for No. 59 is in surprises 
[2000] bankruptcy effect associated with 
(Archiva!) 1975 and 1996 SAS No. 59 
GCOs are 
significan ti y 
smaller than 
bankruptcy 
surprises 
associated with 
both SAS 
No. 59 clean 
opinions and 
... 
SAS No. 34 
¡f: ·GCOs;The 
,.• difference 
, _ between the 
going concern 
bankruptcy 
surprise and the 
clean opinion 
bankruptcy 
surprise under 
SAS No. 59 is 
greater than !he 
corresponding 
difference 
under SAS 
No. 34 
Willenborg and 270 small Whether Whether lhe Organizations 
McKeown NASDAQ stock is company that received a 
[2000] !POs, delisted received a GCO at iPO 
(Archiva!) 1993-1994 within 2 GCO are more likely 
years ofiPO to be delisted 
" within two 
years of the 
IPO dale; The 
GCO helps 
uninfonned 
investors 
because it 
reduces the 
amountof 
' ' uncertainty 
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Blay and Geiger 121 U.S. Abnormal Whether finn Abnormal 
[200 1] public returns subsequenliy returns for 
(Archiva!) companies goes bankrupl compa.nies thal 
receiving eventually 
first-time went bankrupt 
GCOs during were higher 
1990-1992 than for 
companies tl1at 
did not 
eventually go 
bankrupt 
Elias and 285 U.S. Credit Audil report Explanatory 
1 
Johnston [2001 ] commercial recommend- with going paragraph 
{Experimental) loan officers ation, concern indicating 
_j Con[ideuce explanatory going conccrn 
leve!, paragraph uncertainty 
Bankruptcy versus does not 
likelihood standard provide 
report with no additional 
explanatory information 
paragraph and does not 
-- influence loan 
officers ' 
- assessments of 
1 bank:ruptcy 
.Bessell et al. 122 Probability Report format Modified audit 
[20031 participants of lending ('except for' reports did 
O~xperiUJental) received an mouey to quaJified, not have 
ungualified company, 'emphasis of incremental 
report and i nterest rate · matter plus information 
108 recei ved a to charge, note content to 
modified one perceived identifying financia! 
and they were ability to going concern statement users 
surveyed on service debt, issue, - once a going 
the report and standard) concern 
likelihood contíngency is 
company disclosed, the 
wi ll continue explanatory 
as going paragraph in 
concem the auditor's 
report did not 
convey new 
information 
. : ~ ·.· 
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Pucheta- 154 Spanish Abnormal Whetherthe Modified audit 
Martinez et al. companies returns company opinions did 
[2004] with audit received a nothave 
(Archiva!) qualifications GCO information 
from 1992- value for 
1995 Spanish 
investors 
Taffler et al. Explore the Abnormal Length of The market 
[2004] medium-term returns time (months) under-
(Archiva!) price reaction after GCO responded to 
to going issued the issuance of 
concern audit bad news in the 
report medium-term 
disclosures by 
London Stock 
Exchange over 
caleñdar year 
O'Reilly et al. 1153 highly Stock price Líkelihood of The extent to 
[2006] experienced estimations recovery from which the 
(Experimental) financi a! auditors environment 
analysts were (insura!fce, no perceived the 
asked how insurance), auditor as an 
often they use audit opinion insurer 
company (standard moderated the 
performance unqualífied, effect of a 
for decision going concem going concem 
making modified), on investor 
and opinion judgments 
of índustry 
specialists 
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Schaub [2006a] 79 announcing Abnormal Actual return; Investors 
(Archiva!) firms from rerurns Retum on overrcacted to 
1984-1996 CRSP the 
equally- announcement 
weighted ofa GCO; 
market Announcing 
portfolio finns often 
offered share 
buy-back 
programs 
immediately 
following a 
,. GCO; 70%of 
~~ 
the average 
loss was 
recovered 
within five 
days ofthe 
announcement 
Schaub [2006b] Electric Abnormal Actual return A contagian 
(Archiva!) service firms retums on effect was 
. anno~ncing announcement present intra-
' GCOs in lhe da y industry for a 
-· major firm lhat 
financia! received a 
·-
media, GCO 
1984-2004 
Jir:erbohn et al. Medium-term Abnormal Whether the Evidence of a 
[2007] rnarket returns company medium-term 
(Archival) reaction to received a adverse effect 
first time first-time for first-time 
GCOs in the GCO going concern 
12 months recipients prior 
before and to the 
after announcement; 
disclosures for however, the 
the Auslraliao adverse impact 
Stock did not persist 
Exchange subsequent to 
the 
announcement 
. ...  ? 
-, 
;.¡~ ... ~ 
:~¡ 
¡¡; 
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Ogneva and 
Subramanyam 
(2007] 
(Archiva!) 
Citron et al. 
[2008] 
(Archiva!) 
Aldhizer III et 
al. f2009] 
(Archiva!) 
Gassen and 
Skaife [2009] 
(Archiva!) 
.loumal of Accormting Literaw re 
11 59 GC Abnormal Daily 
opinions for returns cumulative 
the U.S. from dividend 
1993-2004 return; 
and 91 GC Expected 
opinions in return 
Australia from 
2000-2004 
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4.1 Consequences of GCOs to the Client 
While a GCO is expected to have significant effects on the client, not many 
studies have investigated the client-specific effects. Specifically, we found only 
two sludies that shed light on the client~specific consequences GCOs carry to 
the audit client. First, Nogler [1995] provided evidence concerning sorne gen-
eral outcomes to the client receiviryg a GCO. Nogler [1995] followed-up on 
GCOs issued from 1983-1991 and found that about 10 percent of GCO clients 
continue to receive GCOs, and abóut one-third werit through bankruptcy, 
changed form through dissoiution or merger, or subsequently received clean 
ópinions. Second, Krishnan and Yang [2009] found that GCOs are positively 
associated with longer auclit report lags, or the time from a company's fiscal 
year end to the audit repot1 date. 
2010 Gissel, Robertm11, Srefaniak 127 
4.2 Client Stakeholder Reactions to GCOs 
4.2.1 Client Stockholders 
As the generally accepted purpose of business is to increase shareholdcr 
wealth, a more common focus of GCO researchers has been the effcct that 
GCOs have on client stockholders. Jones [1996] found that GCOs impacted 
financia U y distressed tírms' stock prices such that mean abnormal ret:urns sur-
roundíng the release of the auditor's report were negative for firms receiving 
GCOs and positive for distressed firms receiving clean opinions. Similarly, 
severa} studies províde evidence of negative returns followíng GCOs [Carlson 
el al., 1998; Menon and Williams, 201 0], especially when the GCO is unex-
pected [Fleak and Wílson, 1994] or the GCO is due to financing or debt cove-
napt issues [Menon and Williarns, 2010]. In addition, the negative market reac-
tiol/ to GCOs is not sensitive to whether the GCO is disclosed befare the ammal 
report date [Citron et aL, 2008]. Further, Fields and Wilkins [ 1991] and Ka usar 
et al. [2009] found that the market fully responded to the withdrawal of a going 
concern announcement, also indicating information content in the GCO. 
Subramanyam and Wild [1996] examined the informational value of GCOs in a 
diffcrent manner, but their results also suggest a negative reaction to GCOs. 
They computed Altrnan Z-scores as a proxy for going concern status, and 
foúnd that earnings persistence is lower for companies that are likcly to receive 
GCOs. 
,._ Aldhizer III et al. [2009] investigated the informational value of GCOs in a 
setting that differed from prior research in two aspects: (1) they used data from 
the. post-SOX era; and (2) they examined abnormal returns following auditor 
switches after a GCO. Their results indicated that when companies switch audit 
firms, the GCO results in positive abnom1al retums. Investors might, undcr 
sóri1e circumstances, perceive the auditor as an insurer rather than as an entity 
providing new information to the market. Investigatíng this possibility, 
O'Reilly et al. [2006] found that the extent to which stakeholders perceive 
auditors as an insurer reduces the negative impact of a GCO. Another modera-
tor of thc informativeness of GCOs is investor type [Willenborg and McKe-
own, 2000]. Willenborg and McKeown [2000] found that organizations that 
receive GCOs when going public were more likely to be delisted within two 
ycars of going public, and suggested that GCOs help reduce uncertainty for 
uninformed investors. 
The negative reaction concerning the GCO company itself can ha ve anega-
tive contagian effeet that adversely affects share prices of other companies 
within the same industry [Schaub, 2006b]. Other research indicates that reac, 
tions to GCOs might be understated, as investors in both the U.K. [TafHer et 
al., 2004] and the U.S. [Kausar et al., 2009] underreacted to GCOs in the me-
dium-term (one-year). However, Schaub [2006a] contended that investors over-
react rather than underreact to GCOs based on his findirig that nearly 70 per-
cent of the average Jos ses on the announcement date were recovered within five 
days ofthe GCO. 
Other research suggests that in sorne settings, a GCO can have positive 
consequences for the client and its .stakeholders. Chen and Church [1996] 
found that GCOs can lessen the negative stock price reactíon of a bankruptcy 
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filing across rhree- , five-, and seven-day windows surrounding the filing. Addi-
tionally, Morris and Stawser [1999] found that bank regulators were_ more 
likely to allow banks to continue operating if the bank received a GCO from a 
Big N audit firm. . 
Another possibility is that markets do not react ro GCOs. StudJes support-
ing this view have fouod that the Australian market [0g11eva and Subra-
manyam, 2007; Bessell et al. , 2003] and the Spanish market [Pucheta-Martinez 
et al., 2004] did nol reacl to GCOs, and that the observed abnormal retw·ns 
fo!Jowing GCOs in the U.S. were sensitive to the choice of expected retum 
[Ogneva and Subramanyam,. 2007]. 
Herbohn et al. [2007] found that medium-terrn underreactions to firs t-time 
GCOs do not persist over time. Kwon and Wild [1994] used a sample of com-
panies that received first-time GCOs during the first tlu·ee years of SAS No. 59, 
which changed standards conceming the issuance of GCOs. To investigate 
infonnational value, ilie authors exarnined whether abnormal stock price reac-
tions occur during the years preceding the first-time GCO. Kwon and Wild 
[1994] found that first-time GCOs are informative, as tl1e first-time GCO com-
panies experieuced abno¡mal equity reactions during each of the two years 
preceding the GCO relative to the third and fourtl1 years prior to the first-time 
GCO. 
Blay and Geiger [200 1] examined the infonnational value of first-li me 
GCOs, as well as whether abnormal ren1rns differ depending on whether tbe 
client eventually underwent bankruptcy proceedings. They found no overall 
association between abnormal returns and first-tirne GCOs, but iliat abnormal 
remrns for con)panies that eventually go bankrupt were higher than for compa-
nies that did not eventual! y go bankrupt. Blay et aL [20 1 0] al so investigated 
fi rst-time GCOs, and found that these opinions result in a shift in the manner in 
which market parúcipanL'> value the client company, and found that following a 
fi rst-time GCO, market participants shift their valuation focus from both bal-
ance sbeet and incorne statement iterns to only balance sheet items. 
Gassen and Ska ife [2009] investigated market reactions to firsl-time GCOs 
following the German audit reform of 1998, which required ·auditors to repmt 
going concern uncertainties. They found that GCOs issucd befare the reform 
clid not affect the German market, but first-time GCOs issued after fue reform 
were assocíated with negative abnormal returns. Conceming the effects of 
changes in U.S. auditíng stanclards, Holder-Webb and Wilki ns (2000] com-
parecl the relative information content of GCOs issued under SAS No. 34 and 
SAS No. 59. Holder-Webb and WHkins [2000] found that bankrnptcy surprises 
associated with SAS No. 59 GCOs were signjficantly smaller than bankruptcy 
surprises associated with both· SAS No. 59 clean opinions and SAS No. 34 
GCOs, and that the difference between the GCO bunkruptcy surprise and the 
clean opinion bankruptcy surprise under SAS No. 59 was greater than the cor-
responding difference under SAS No. 34. 
The somewhat inconsistent results 'of these studies provjde severa! fruitf'ul 
opportunities for future research. Can conference calls, througb explanation of 
the exception, mitigate any negative market reactions to GCOs? Additionally, 
researchers could examine whether the mm·ket climate since SOX has exacer-
bated any responses to ·GCOs. Do companies receiving GCOs post-SOX ex-
perience more negative repercussions than companies receiving GCOs pre-
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SOX? Fulure research also should extend Aldhlzer Ill e t aJ. [2009] to ascertain 
whether the positive effect of GCOs following an auditor switch is an effect 
attributable lo the post-SOX era, settings following anditor changes, or both. 
4.2.2 Client Creditors 
Creditors are sensitive to the prospect of loan defaults, and are accordingly 
sens1tive to the possibility that their clients will declare bankruptcy. Researcb 
p ublished at the time of Asare's review indicated that going concern uncer-
tainty disclosures generally increased client creditors' risk assessmcms. Wil-
kins [1997] cxamined the association between GCOs and credit reactions , spc-
ciíically cred itors' decisions of whether to waive initial debt covenant. viola-
t\ons. Wilkins [19971 found that creditors are less likely to wave initial debt 
covenant violations if the auditor issues a GCO. More recently, Elias and 
Jollnston [200 1] in vestigatecl whether auclit reports with a going concern ex-
pianatory paragraph provide incremental infonn alion beyoncl the required foot-
note disclosure by havi ng 285 cornmercial loan officers complete an experi-
mental task. Elias and Johnston [2001] fou nd that a going concern explanatory 
paragraph hacl no incremental information content and did not influence loan 
ofiicers ' assessments of bankruptcy likelihood. 
4.3' Consequences of GCOs to Audit Firms 
4.J.l Auditor Ratification and Switching 
_ Auditors also run the risk of incLnTing damages when issuing a GCO. In 
particular, one of the most salie nt reparations auditors face ís that of not being 
ü ttif ied for the subsequent audit (if they so desired to remain the auditor). 
S ainty et a l. [2002] invesLigated shareholder dissatisfaction with the auditor 
following GCOs, and found that GCOs, especially unexpected GCOs, were 
positively associated with shareholder dissatisfaction. The majority of research 
we include in this section, however, focuses on actual auditor switching foJlow-
ing modified opinions, despite Haskins and Williams [1990] earlier findings 
that the audit op1nion was one of the Jeast imporlant factors for switching aud1-
tors.7 
Matsumura et al. [ 1997] proposed a theory relating to GCOs and audit 
switching. Their model ·indicated that cl i~nts are less likely to switch if they 
believe the potential successor firm also would also issue a GCO, but that audi-
tors are less likely to issue a GCO if they believe the client will switch. Empiri-
cal evidence does not explicitly address the theory provided by Matsurnura et 
al. (1997]. However, Tucker and Matsumura [1998] found that increasi ng the 
Jikelihood that successor audi tors will issue clean opinions does not increase 
auditor pa1tícipants' issuance of clean opinions, and that client participants' are 
more likely to switch as auditor reporting varies. Sinúlarly, Carcello and Palm-
rose [1994] found tbat GCOs are associated with higher auditor dismissal rates. ' 
1 Fur a re\' iew of thc litcrature un auditor s~itching, ple~se s~ Stefaniak e l al. [2009). 
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Krish11an and Krishnan [ 1997] examined auditor resignations and dismiss-
als surrounding GCOs and clients with high litigation risk. They found that 
when liLigation risk is high, auditors that issue GCOs are more likely to resign 
than be dismissed by the cl ient. Krishnan and Krishnan [1997] concluded Lhat 
litigation risk can int1uence the market for audit services. 
Other research indicates that switching folJowing a modified opiníon is not 
simply based on the presence of tbe modification. Krishnan [1994] found that 
companies receiving GCOs that were "undeserved; i.e., the result of a conser-
vative treatment" [p. 207] were more likely to switch auditors than companies 
receiving deserved ciean opinions. Similarly, Geiger et al. [1998] found that 
undeserved, first-timc GCOs are associated with a higher likelihood that the 
client wiJI dismiss the auditor, but switching auditors does not affect the likeli-
hood of removing the GCO in the subsequent period. Hudaib and Cooke [2005] 
found that the likelihood that a client will switch auclitors correlates positively 
with the severity of the modification. Thus, the relationship betv.veen GCOs and 
auditor switching appears more complex than simply the presence of a GCO. 
Carcello anct Neal [2003] found that companies were more likely to switch 
auditors following f.irst-time GCOs if the committee had greater proportions of 
affiliated directors, if committee members owned higher levels of stock, and if 
committce members held fewer director positions on other boards. Accord-
ingly, audit committee independence appears to be an important factor related 
to switching following GCOs. 
Research from other jurisdictions also contributes to our understanding of 
thc relationship between GCOs and auditor switching. Evidence fi·om the U.K. 
[Citron and Taffler, 1 992] and Australia [Carey et al., 2008] also suggests that 
clients receiving GCOs are more likely to switch auditors than clients that re-
ceive clean opinions. In Belgium, regulations require companies to engage their 
auditors for renewable three-year periods, Vanstraeleu [2003] found that clients 
were four times more Iikely to switch auditors at the end of the mandatory re-
tention term if they reccived GCOs in the final yea.r of the term than if they 
received GCOs in the previous two years. Concerning mandatory audit firm 
rotation, evidence from Spain suggests that this ·requirement increases Spanish 
auditan;' propensity to issue GCOs [Ruiz-Ba.rbadillo et al., 2009]. 
4.3.2 Litigation 
Iu addition to auditor ratification and switching, the auditor must all con-
tend with the possibility of litigation resulting from their association with a 
going concern entity. Blacconiere and DeFond [1997] examined auditor pro-
pensity to issue GCOs for the last tinancial statement released by public sav-
ings and loan companies that declared bankruptcy .. They found that whiJe audi-
tors typically issue GCOs (19 of 24 cases), those tbat did usually faced lawsuits 
(tbe auditor issued a GCO in five o( ·:;even cases that were litigated). Blac-
coJ;Liere and DeFond [1997], accordingly, suggested that GCOs in the year prior 
to che failure of a savings and Imm do not prevent auditor litigation. 
Carcello and Palmrose [1994] investigated whether GCOs issued prior to 
bank:ruptcy protect auditors from litigation. Carcello and Palmrose [I994] 
found that companies that received GCOs were less likely to be litigated by 
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shareholders, that dismissal rates wcre highest when the auditor issues a GCO, 
and that GCOs weaken plaintiff' s claims against auditors. Similar! y, Mong and 
Roebuck [20051 found that issuing a GCO reduces litigation. We believe op-
portunities for research concerning auditor litigation are especially relevant in 
the current environment given recent bank tailures. Prior rcsearch suggests that 
auditors could face litigation when financiúl institutions collapse [e.g., Blac-
conicrc and DeFond, 1997; Hill and Metzger, 1992]. Accordingly, future re-
search could investigate litigation against auditors involving clean opinions 
issued to U.S. financial institutions that received governrnent bailouts in 2008-
2009. For instance, does empirical evidence support the concerns of Sikka 
[20091, who notes ti1at auditors frequently failed to issue GCOs for the audits 
immediately preceding rhe high-profile bank failures of 2008? Are lawsuits 
rmore or less likely folimving ba ilouts? Also, has litigation exposure increased 
for auditors who fail to issue a going concem for a company that subsequently 
v-Jynt bankrupt? 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
Asare provided a review of acadenúc research on GCOs as well as a sum-
mary of standards impacting GCOs. Over the past two decades, researchers 
have conlinued to investigare issues conceming the formation and conse-
qt1ences of GCOs. Additionally, new standarcls and regulations ha ve emerged 
th~1t impact the formation of GCOs. In this paper, we sumrnarize current stan-
d.:-irds and regulations on GCOs. We also review acaclernic literature published 
since Asm-e's review that addresses the formation and consequences of GCOs. 
In addition to t11e specitic conclusions and research questions discussed in 
our review, we believe two issues meril additional consideration. First, auditors 
face a s ignificant contlict between profitability incentives and litigation risk 
concerns during the process o [ deciding whether to íssue a GCO. Tbe literature 
we reviewed indicates t11at auditor decis ion making in sorne cases is more re-
flective of profitability incentives, but in other cases is more retlecti ve of litíga-
tion risk concerns. Therefore, our understanding of the impact of these conflict-
ing incentives on GCO formation is s till developing. We propase several re-
search suggestions in our section on this tradeoff (3.3.1.2) that can continue to 
improve our understanding of these issues. 
Second, GCOs, including first-time GCOs, matter to client stockholders in 
tbat GCOs oftcn are associated with abnonnal equity reactions. We identified 
few s tudies that investigate the conseqw:!nces GCOs carry to other client stake-
holders such as creclitors. The majority of the literature on consequences of 
GCOs to client stakeholders focuses on equity reac tions, though Ogneva and 
Subramanyam [2007] explicitly called for more research on reactions from 
bonclholders and analysts to GCOs. Accordingly, we reiterate Asare' s [1990, p. 
56] suggestion that future researcb "should explore the impact of going concem 
report~g on suppliers of debt capital, the client' s investment/production deci-
s ions,·regulatory agencies, and labor/management relations and contract nego-
tiations." Our review indicates that tlús suggestion offered by Asare remains 
unanswered, and we believe the need for such research sti11 exists. 
Aithough many questions concemi.ng GCOs have been answered by the 
s tudies we reviewed, other questioris remain. Accordingly, as part of our re-
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view, we offer suggesrions for fut ure rescarch in many of our subsections, and 
present these research questio ns in Table 4 for convenjent reference. 
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TABLE 4: A Summary of Future Research Opportunities 
Panel A: Future Rcseru:ch Opportuniries Presented in Scction 2.0- The 
Responsibility for Re porting Going concern Uncertainties 
2.2 The E[fecrs of Standards ami Regu./a1ions 011 GCO Formarion tmd Issuam:e 
2.2.1 The Effecls of SAS Nos. 58 and 59 on GCO Formarion and lssunnce 
133 
Are the long-term effects of SAS Nos. 58 and 59 on audit quality are similar to the 
r 
short-term consequences observed in prior research? 
2.2.2 The E.tfects o{Laws and Regulations 011 GCO Formation l//1{/ ls.mance 
The PCAOB has issued a concept release that would potentially require partners lo 
sign d1e audit opinion [PCAOB 2009]. Would a partner be more conscrvative in GCO 
judgme nls if he/sbe is required to personally sign the uudir opinion? 
What are the implications of the U.S. government' s response to the recent financia.! 
.. :· reces::.ion on the issuance of GCOs? For instance, how do bailouts intluence going 
concern judgments and decisions? 
Panel B: Future Research Opportunities Presented in Section 3.0- Auditors' 
Identification und Formation of GCOs 
3.1 Characteristics o.f Clients Receil'in~ GCOs 
- · Are the differences in prior research concerning the relationship between client s ize 
and GCOs due to differences in control variables, or differences in U1c regulations or 
-.- risks to tbe auditor in the U .K. versus Lhe U .S.? 
Does thc prcsence of a financia ! expert, as required by SOX [U.S.H .R., 2002], influ-
ence audltors' propensity lo issue GCOs? Other corporate governance factors that 
could influence GCO formation are frequency of audil committee meetings, the num-
. ber of boards on which each audit committee member serves, and length of service of 
audit comrnittee members. 
3.1.1 Client Eam.ings Managemellt 
An experime ntal study that manipulates the reason for abnonnal accruals cou!d help 
reconcile inconsistent results from prior literature concerning the relationship between 
abnorma1 accruals and auditors ' propensity to issue GCOs. 
Sin ce But.ler et al. [2004] and Fmncis and Krishnan [ 1999 J u sed pre-SO X d ata , fu tu re 
research cou ld invesligate whether changes in conservatism fo llowing SOX impact the 
relut.ionship between the mag nitude of accruals and auditors' propensity to issue 
GCOs. 
Explore the relationship between GCOs and additional eamings management maltcrs 
could be investigated (e.g., real earnings management, meeting eamings cx.pectations, 
using special income statement items). 
3. 1.2 Cliem Press Coverage 
Following Joe [2003], what are the effects of negati ve publicity from media such as 
television and Internet sources on auditors' GCO judgments and decisions? 
If the media report positive infonnalion about distressed clients, are auditors less 
likcly lo issue GCOs, perhaps incrcasing the risk of Type II errors? 
3.2 GCOs and Forecastíng Bankruptcies 
·.~-
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3.2.1 Forecas/ing Models 
Whíle the Lenard et al. (2000] hybrid model and t.he Lenard et al. [1995] ncural net-
work are accurate predictors of GCOs, are they practica! decision aids? Lenard et nl. 
[1995] do note that their model should be tested by auditors. Do auditors possess suffi-
cient technícal expertise to use these models? If not, whut degree of lrai ning is re-
quired, and would the model pass cost-benefit considerations? 
To what extenr do audit fi rms actually rely on bankruprcy prediction models in prac-
tice, and would a GCO flag triggered by a bankruptcy prediction model be sufficient 
evidence for an auditor issue a GCO? 
lf auditors are not willing to use such models, what factors drive those decisions? 
3.2.2 The Self-Fuljilling Prophecy 
Given conflicting results of prior research, does a self-fulfill ing prophecy exist? 
3.3 Auditor Characteristics 
3.3.1 Auditor Economic Incentives 
33.1.1 Audít Fees, Non-Arrdit Fees, (111(/ Auditor lndependence 
Future research should examine purely post-SOX periods to determine if early resulls 
conceming GCOs and non-audit services still hold in the post-SOX_Qeriod. 
Following Lai [2009], would allowing expanded non-audit services, but requiring 
auditors to disclose all fees, improve independence? 
What other potential sources of increased independence in the formation of the GCO 
exist? For ex.ample, would an cngagement review pnrmer reach a similar opinion of an 
entity's abilityto continue as agoing concern as the engagement partner? 
3.3.1.2 Trade-aff.\' Berween Profitability and Litigation 
Future research should invesligate whether the regulatory changes of t11e fi rsl decade 
of the 21 '1 century ha ve impacted the trade-off between profitability incentives and 
litigation risks, as lhe majority of U.S. research relies on data thatpredales SOX 
J1I\5w•,t'J\1lfLÜI::t&'élll' lünnreúu' ér'i~:s á'n<:l' en~üÜfg gov l!i'hmeift' thüouts iiü1bencect' GCO' 
formation? For instance, if lhe auditor is aware a company wi ll receive federal assis-
tance (e.g., TARP funds), does the auditor consider that infonnation when determining 
whether a GCO is appropriate? 
Replicate Blay [2005] with a more salient profitability incentive maúipulation, perhaps 
by explicitly mentioning the amount of revenue the accounling firm would lose if the 
client switched audit firms. 
lf auctitors provided a probability of GCO rather thun un opinion expressing doubt 
about lhe cl ient's ability to continue to operate, would htigation risk increase,, de-
crease, or not change? 
-3.3.2 Auditor Cognitive Processe~· and GCOs 
Replicate Ashton and Kennedy [2002) using partners and managers rather than staff 
auditor particípants to determine if thc observed recen e y effect is robust to experience. 
Does the timing of the decision aid intluence it."> effectiveness concerning GCO judg-
ments? Would similar results occur if the auditor receives tbe prompt befare evaluat-
ing any evidence? ~ 
Do auditors in some situations, perhaps· in response to econonuc incentives, auend 
more to _Q_osi tive information items to avoid alienating the client? 
Is it possible that arder effects interact on sorne level with other engagement risk fac-
tors (e.g., litigalion risk, reputation risk, etc.) to influence auditor GCO formalion? 
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3.3.3 Auditor Expertise 
SOX requires audit partner rotation every five years, which provides :m opportunity tor 
future research lo examine whether partner-specific tenure int1uenccs GCO issunnce. 
In addition, future research could examine the GCO formation in a group setting 
(similar to recen! research on fraud risk brainstorming), or how engagement partners 
and additional technical advisors help fonn tbe GCO opinion. 
Panel C: Fuwre Research Opporrunities Presen.ted i ll 
Section 4.0- Consequeuces of GCOs 
4.2 Clienr Stakeholder Reactions to GCOs 
4.2.1 Cliem Stockholders 
Can conference calls, through explanation of the exception, mitigate any 
1n1arket reactions to GCOs? 
.·Has the market climate since SOX has exacerbated any responses lO GCOs? 
negative 
Exteud Aldhizer III et al. [2009] lo ascertain whether the positive effect of GCOs fol-
lowing an auditor switch is :m effect attributable to the post-SOX eru, seltings follow-
ing auditor changes, or bolh. 
4.3 Consequences ofGCOs to Artdit Firms 
4.3.2 Liti ~ation 
. -,Does empirical evidence support the concerns of Sikka [2009], who notes that auditors 
!frec¡uently failed to issue GCOs for the audits irnmediately preceding the high-profile 
ibank failures of2008? Are Jawsnits more or less likely following bailouts? 
Has litigation exposure increased for audilors who fail lo issue a going concern for a 
company that subsequently went bankrupt? 
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